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I. INTRODUCTION
The media attention given to the criminal' and civil 2 trials of
Orenthal James Simpson has focused the attention of mainstream society on
the issues surrounding domestic violence.3 Unfortunately, instead of
* Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. A.B., Princeton
University, 1990; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1993. For reading early drafts of this article,
providing feedback on my ideas and generally supporting my endeavors, I thank Jody Armour,
Janet Findlater, Jessica Litman, Martha Minow, Reginald Leamon Robinson, Sandra Van
Burkleo, and Jonathan Weinberg.
'People v. Simpson, No. BA0972 11, 1995 WL 704381 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 1995)
(lasting fifteen months between June 1994 and October 1995).
2 Rufo v. Simpson, No. SC03197; Goldman v. Simpson, No. SC036340; Brown v.
Simpson, No. SC03687; 1997 WL 114574 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 1997).
3 While this "attention" has created greater awareness of the issues and prompted more
women to get help, the acquittal of O.J. in the criminal trial, and its portrayal by the media,
unfortunately has been disheartening to victims of abuse and empowering to abusers. For
example, many batterers now boast that they can get away with abusive behavior because "O.J.
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prompting greater awareness of the magnitude of the issues,4 the media and
the actors in the legal proceedings manipulated stereotypes and obscured the
issues of domestic violence.
Through the lens of the media focus on the O.J. trials, the issue of
domestic violence has implicitly become "black and white." Literally, beliefs
about justice in these cases were portrayed by media polls as divided by race.
For example, a Los Angeles Times poll conducted near the end of the civil
trial indicated that "71 % of whites said they thought Simpson committed the
murders, while 70% of blacks said they thought he was innocent." 5 There
were no polls broken down by gender. In fact, we don't know if the polls that
were done by race included proportional numbers of men and women of either
race. Would it have been more or less significant if men and women
(regardless of race) held the same views about the issues of domestic
got away with it;" and "to O.J." has become a verb used to threaten women. See, e.g., Mark
Puls, Simpson Case a Blessing and Curse, Abused Women Say, Detroit News, Oct. 24, 1995,
at A4; Wade v. State, 951 S.W.2d 886 (1997) (while holding a knife to her throat, defendant
asked his victim if "she wanted to end up like Nicole Simpson"); Peterson v. State, 930 P.2d
414 (1996) (while stalking his victim, defendant said he was going to kill her and she was going
to be the next Nicole Simpson); Miller v. State, 477 S.E.2d 430 (1996)(when defendant saw his
former girlfriend dancing with another man, he told her she was going to be another Nicole
Simpson to his O.J.).
4 Media attention is generally only given to those rare cases when women use
violence, despite the fact that somewhere between one-third to half of all female murder victims
are killed by a male intimate. See Nancy S. Ehrenreich, O.J. Simpson & the Myth of
Gender/Race Conflict, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 931 (1996) (noting the unfortunate fact that it takes
a high-profile case to give domestic violence issues any attention despite its prevalence in
society); Ronet Bachman, Ph.D. and Linda E. Saltzman, Ph.D., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Violence
Against Women: Estimates From the Redesigned Survey, 1(1995) [hereinafter Violence Against
Women 1Il (noting that estimates are conservative since "[m]any factors inhibit women from
reporting these victimization both to police and to interviewers, including the private nature of
the event, the perceived stigma associated with one's victimization, and the belief that no
purpose will be served in reporting it."); Ronet Bachman, Ph.D., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Violence
Against Women: A National Crime Victimization Survey Report 1 (1994) [hereinafter Violence
Against Women I]. "The public education on domestic violence that we need as a society can't
happen in the 'quick fix' of a trial,"[ but needs to be discussed through broader educational
vehicles and in the wide variety of social fora that affect our daily lives and the daily lives of
victims of abuse.] Elizabeth M. Schneider, What Happened to Public Education About
Domestic Violence? in Postmortem: The O.J. Simpson Case 82 (Jeffrey Abramson ed., 1996).
'Abigail Goldman and Mary Curtius, Simpson Civil Case: For Many It's as Simple
as Black and White Reaction, L.A. Times, Feb. 5, 1997, at A14.
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violence?6 There were also no polls broken down by income or social status.
Would it have mattered if people's belief in Simpson's innocence or guilt
correlated to their relative income? Most significantly, these polls did not
reveal the basis for the responses of the pollees. Do we know if their
perceptions of justice were based on race, or on gender, or on class, or on the
available evidence, or on all of the above?
The criminal trial was portrayed as a defeat for battered women and
simultaneously as a victory for the African American community and the civil
trial as a vindication of the rights of battered women and retributive of
mainstream (read white) justice.7 Implicit in this characterization is the
understanding that the battered women imagined were white.' This
conceptualization existed, most obviously, because Nicole Brown Simpson
was white and the defendant was black. Notwithstanding the obvious, the
"racial divide" reflected a misuse of the disbelieving opinions of black
women, particularly those on the jury of the criminal trial. 9 to indicate that the
issues of the trial had import only as determined by race. Also important in
the representations of domestic violence was that it was only a "woman's
issue." Thus, with the foregoing characterizations, the battle-lines concerning
6 See Jeffrey Abramson, We. the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy
104 (1994).
' At the end of the criminal trial, "[sleveral white males said they were angry that a
domestic abuser like Simpson could walk. But it seemed rather disingenuous for them to now
rush to make an African-American a poster child for spousal abuse when the issue has been
epidemic among all men." Derrick Z. Jackson, Take a Deep Breath, Everyone: We All Lost,
Boston Globe, Oct. 6, 1995, at 19.
'Not so obvious is the ways in which stereotype characterizes a true "victim" as being
a white woman. See infra text accompanying notes 80-94.
9 For example, the statements of Brenda Moran, an African American woman who
served on the O.J. criminal jury, were often cited concerning domestic violence in the trial:
"Domestic abuse-to me that was a waste of time. This was a murder trial, not domestic abuse.
If you want to get tried for domestic abuse, go in another courtroom and get tried for that." See,
e.g., CNN & Company, transcript #750 (Cable News Network, Inc. broadcast, Jan. 15, 1996).
The intention of the media in using this statement was quite clearly to show that black women
were unsympathetic to the issues of domestic violence. Nonetheless there were other plausible
interpretations of Ms. Moran's statements. For example, given the entire context of the
prosecutions case, she could just have easily been suggesting that, even though the prosecution
was able to prove that O.J. did abuse Nicole, emphasis on motive was a waste of time without
better proof of opportunity, intent, and ability.
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domestic abuse were not drawn in terms of gender,' ° but primarily in terms of
race. "
In purposefully using the voice of an individual black woman, the
popular national media was seeking the "monolithic voice of the black
community"' 2 to include in their stream of sound bites through which they
'0 Given the fact that domestic violence is disproportionately perpetrated by men
against women (see Violence Against Women II, supra note 4, at 4 (based on the Uniform
Crime Reports, in 1992 approximately 28% of female victims of homicide were killed by their
husband, ex-husband, or boyfriend; approximately 3% of male victims were killed by their wife,
ex-wife, or girlfriend); Violence Against Women I, supra note 4, at 6 (noting that approximately
33% of violence against women is by an intimate, whereas only 5% of violence against men is
by an intimate)), it would be logical to think the "battle-lines" would be drawn in terms of
gender. However, I am not suggesting that this is the appropriate way to address the issue of
domestic violence. Aside from the fact that domestic violence is also perpetrated by men against
men, women against women, women against men, adults against children, and adults against the
elderly, domestic violence and its inherent relational power imbalance are issues that we all must
address to eradicate them from society.
" One columnist said of the reactions to O.J.'s acquittal and its aftermath, "And
nowhere was that divide more stark than it was between black women and white women,"
Isabel Wilkerson, Whose Side to Take: Women, Outrage And the Verdict on O.J. Simpson,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1995, sec. 4, 1. On the jury for the criminal trial, there were eight African
Americans; there were also eight women. Another journalist pointed out that "much has been
made of the pigmentation of the O.J. jury but relatively little of its gender." Les Payne, O.J.'s
Subplot: Gender and Race, Newsday, Feb. 5, 1995, at A36. In addition, even though there was
some discussion of the defendant's ability to "buy his freedom" (especially through reference
to the money spent on the "dream team"), relatively little was made of class distinctions. As bell
hooks points out, "[tihis tragedy would not have happened if male violence against women was
not so acceptable in our culture.., we know that whenever sexuality is involved and gender in
our culture, people often prefer to talk about race. Race is easier for people to--it's easier to
racialize something because if we make it a case of gender, we have to see a man like O.J.
Simpson as very empowered by class and by patriarchy." Interview: bell hooks, Charlie Rose
(WNET Educational Broadcasting Company broadcast, Oct. 24, 1995).
2 "All too often in our society, it is assumed that one can know all there is to know
about black people by merely hearing the life story and opinions of one black person." bell
hooks, Ain't I A Woman: Black Women and Feminism 11 (1981). This is faulty, not only for
the assumption that one opinion can represent those of others, but also because it forces the
dissection of the attributes and experiences of the individual. Kimberl6 Crenshaw points out
that "[fleminist efforts to politicize experiences of women and antiracist efforts to politicize
experiences of people of color have frequently proceeded as though the issues and experiences
they each detail occur on mutually exclusive terrains." Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality.
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241, 1242 (1991);
see also, Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581,
588 (1990); Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers and Politics of
Identification, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1769 (1992).
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serve us all cafeteria style.' 3 This (mis)use of the "representative one voice"
is intellectually dishonest and socially deceptive in much the same way, but
on a grander scale, as the use of the reprise, "I have (a) black friend(s)," as
proof of the good, non-racist intentions of the speaker. The media's use of the
"monolithic voice" is the means by which issues of gender violence become
issues of racial politics.
This politicization of the issues occurred in the commentary
concerning the O.J. trials and works to obscure the complexity of the situation.
The simplistic and politicized media attention 4 has given this new found
attention to domestic violence the face of a white woman and the disbeliever
the face of a black woman.15 This conceptualization was further reinforced by
"3 An example of this is in the ironic statements of Katie Couric: "...So you can't say
that--that African-Americans think monolithically. However, how do you think black America
would accept a ruling that O.J. Simpson is, in fact, liable, if that is to come to pass?" Interview:
Earl Ofari Hutchinson on the Role of Race in the Simpson Civil Case, Today (NBC television
broadcast, Feb. 3, 1997).
4 ... in televised images after the acquittal, black women smiling to the heavens,
thanking Jesus, and white women, sobbing, unable to speak." Wilkerson, supra note 11. What
televised reports and other media accounts did not emphasize was that there are black women
convinced that Mr. Simpson was guilty, and there are white women who say Mark Fuhrman
planted the bloody glove.
15 The popular media is not alone in characterizing domestic abuse as only of concern
to white women.
The literature on battered women tends to overlook the experiences of non-
majority women. The battered-wife literature typically addresses the issues
of ethnicity and abuse in one of three ways: (1) by failing to mention the
race of the women studied; (2) by acknowledging that only majority women
are included; or (3) by including some women of other non-majority groups
but not in proportion comparable to their number in the national
population.
Robert L. Hampton, Richard J. Gelles and John Harrop, Is Violence in Black Families
Increasing?: A Comparison of 1975 and 1985 National Survey Rates, in Black Family Violence:
Current Research and Theory 5 (Robert L. Hampton ed., 1991).
Contrary to these characterizations, recent studies have shown that those most likely
to fall victim to street crime are also most likely to be subject to domestic abuse. See Southern
California Injury Prevention Research Center, Americans Who Are Black, Under 30, Lower
Income, Less Educated or Urban Dwelling More Likely to Report Domestic Violence, (Jan. 26,
1996), <http:ll www.ph.ucla.edu:80/sph/pr/wr039.html>. As a class, women of color who are
of lower economic status, are the victims of a higher percentage of street crimes. See Violence
Against Women II, supra note 4, at 4-5; Violence Against Women I, supra note 4, at 1; see also,
Jeane Ann Grisso, M.D., M.Sc. et al., Injuries Among Inner-City Minority Women: A
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law
the composition of the civil trial jury which was predominantly white and
predominantly female (though not predominantly both white and female).
6
The stereotypic dichotomies 7 were thus complete: black jury-not guilty;
white jury-guilty (that is, liable).
The purpose of this article is to explore the ways in which the
conceptual violence of stereotype"s reinforces, perpetuates, and contributes to
literal gender violence, domestic abuse, and racial tensions and how these
conceptualizations can be understood through feminist dialectics. 9 Feminists
Population-Based Longitudinal Study, 86 Amer. J. of Pub. Health 67 (1996) (pointing out that
homicide rates are nearly four times higher for African American women than among white
women). By extension, these women are also the victims of a higher percentage of domestic
crime. Domestic violence affects every race, age, and socio-economic class, but it would seem
prudent to at least include to a greater extent in our literature, discussions, and efforts to
eradicate domestic abuse, those who are most affected.
6 The Simpson civil jury consisted of five white women, three white men, one Latina,
one black woman, one black man, and one man of Asian and black descent. See Harriet Chiang,
Whites Dominate Jury for Simpson Civil Trial, San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 18, 1996, at Al.
17 See infra Part II.
18 Stereotypes are commonly held, well-learned, and established associations among
groups and traits that comprise a standardized conception or image invested with special social
meaning. See David L. Hamilton, Steven Stroessner, and Denise M. Driscoll, Social Cognition
and the Study of Stereotyping in Social Cognition: Impact on Social Psychology 291, 309
(Patricia G. Devine, et al. eds., 1994) ("A stereotype consists of the beliefs that are associated
with a particular social group); Wolfgang Stroeb and Chester A. Insko, Stereotype, Preiudice,
and Discrimination: Changing Conceptions in Theory and Research, in Stereotyping and
Preiudice: Changing Conceptions 3, 5 (Daniel Bar-Tal, et al. eds., 1989) (defining stereotypes
as "a set of beliefs about the personal attributes of a group of people"). For a discussion of the
psychologizal and cognitive manifestations and affects of stereotypes in judicial proceedings see
Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Preiudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Preiudice
Habit 83 Cal. L. Rev. 733, 739-759 (1995).
Stereotype has both social-structural manifestations and psychological bases. See
David L. Hamilton, et al., supra; Miles Hewstone, Changing Stereotypes with Disconfirming
Information in Stereotyping and Preiudice: Changing Conceptions 207 (Daniel Bar-Tal, et al.
1989). My focus is primarily on the social-structural effects of stereotype and the ways those
effects condition both actual and perceived justice. Necessarily, the psychological associations
that we have tailor the existence of these stereotypes in society. Thus, I also discuss the
cognitive psychological approaches and explanations for stereotype in understanding how they
are perpetuated and how they might be combated. See infra, Part II.
'9 These analyses rely on a large body of literature exploring patterns of domination,
exclusion, and difference. Whereas I do not devote space in this article to defending the
theoretical approaches upon which I rely, which is a worthwhile task, I nonetheless
acknowledge a range of criticisms of my basic presumptions. See, e.g., Daniel Farber and
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have shown that the normative assumptions underlying the foundations of the
law are primarily "male."2 Unfortunately, the resulting theories and efforts
to replace those norms often relied on the "essential" woman2 as the counter
norm to be included in legal foundations, replicating the "normative"
approach. The "normative" approach and the "essentialist" approach share a
reliance upon forms of stereotype to deflect the characteristics not implicitly
included in the relevant standard.22 Stereotype is an explicit means of
illustrating "difference." Stereotypes may seem less nuanced or sophisticated
than that to which the standardized approaches refer, but nonetheless are
necessary for their existence.23
The issue of domestic violence discussed has been framed by feminist
discourse in three ways that parallel the relevant framework for the discussion
of stereotype. First, feminists have demonstrated the fallacy of the conceptual
Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov: Further Reflections on Scholarship and
Truth, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 647 (1994); Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia
102 Harv. L. Rev. 1745 (1989); Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous
Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 761 (1987).
20 See, e.g., Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and
Law (1987); Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. Women's L.J. (1987); Clare Dalton, Where We
Stand: Observations on the Situation of Feminist Legal Thought, 3 Berkeley Women's L.J. 1
(1987); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Case Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 Harv. L.Rev. 1497 (1983).
21 See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of
Motherhood, 1 . Gender & Law 1 (1993); Regina Austin, Black Women, Sisterhood, and the
Difference/Deviance Divide, 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 877 (1992); Mar I. Matsuda, Beside My
Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 Stan. L.Rev. 1183 (1991); Paulette
M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 Duke
L.J. 365; Harris, supra note 12; Kimberld Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.Chi.L.F. 139; Marlee Kline, Race, Racism, and Feminist Legal
Theory, 12 Harv. Women's L.J. 115 (1989); Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism,
Nature & Difference (1989); Martha Minow, Feminist Reasoning: Getting It and Losing It, 38
J.Legal Ed. 47 (1988); Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion In
Feminist Thought (1988).
221 sometimes refer to the "normative" and "essentialist" approaches collectively as
"standardized" approaches.
23 See Stroeb and Insko, supra note 18, at 5 ("Stereotypes help to preserve or create
positively valued differentiations of a group from other social groups and contribute, therefore,
to the creation and maintenance of group ideologies explaining or justifying a variety of social
actions against the outgroup.").
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split of public and private, relegating family and the "woman's sphere" to the
private, and policy and justice to the public.24 Domestic abuse has
traditionally been consigned to the private realm, accounting for why these
issues have been so difficult to address through the public justice system.25
This dichotomy is itself a means of perpetuating violence. In a similar
fashion, stereotypes are also formulated in dichotomous, oppositional
structures.26 Thus, the conceptual framework of stereotype also conditions the
acceptance of violence.
Second, feminists aim to eradicate violence against women. 27 This
second point is related to the first, since one means of accomplishing the
second is to demonstrate how the "private" realm is interconnected to and
24 See Elizabeth Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 973 (1991);
Olsen, supra note 20 (discussing how the conceptual and ideological division between the
family and the market implicitly affect the role division and conceptualization of male and
female).
25 As Martha Minow points out,
The violence encountered by people within their families has roots and
consequences not confined to those families.... Society is organized to
permit violence in the home; it is organized through images in mass media
and through broadly based social attitudes that condone violence.... Society
permits such violence to go unchallenged through the isolation of families
and the failures of police to respond. Public, rather than private, patterns
of conduct and morals are implicated....
Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family
Violence, 43 Vand. L.Rev. 1665, 1671(1990).
21 See David Hamilton and Steven Sherman, Illusory Correlations: Implications for
Stereotype Theory and Research, in Stereotyping and Prejudice: Changing Conceptions 59
(Daniel Bar-Tal, et al. eds., 1989) (describing how a "cognitive bias, called an illusory
correlation, refers to an erroneous judgment of the relationship between two variables).
27 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, 'The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117, 2135 (1996); Barbara Hart, Battered Women and the Criminal
Justice System, 36 American Behavioral Scientist 624,626 (May 1993); Crenshaw, supra note
12; Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90
Mich L.Rev. 1 (1991); Schneider, supra note 24; Minow, supra note 25; Christine A. Littleton,
Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women,
1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 23; Susan Estrich, Real Rape (1987); MacKinnon, supra note 20; Beth
Richie, Battered Black Women: A Challenge For the Black Community, Black Scholar,
Mar.Apr. 1985, at 41; Jennifer Wriggins, Rape. Racism, and the Law, 6 Harv. Women's L.J.
103 (1983); Susan Schecter, Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles of the
Battered Women's Movement (1982); Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will (1975).
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dependent upon the "public."28 This may be done by showing how the costs
of "private" violence are imposed upon individuals within society and on
society as a whole, and, simultaneously, how public conceptualizations and
responses to "private" violence condition the measure and extent of that
violence. This may also be done by illustrating the shortcomings of
reductionist, dichotomous, oppositional thinking. Understanding conceptual
violence, and the ways in which stereotype perpetuates that violence, is an
integral part of this endeavor.
Third, feminists strive to use context to evaluate justice, rather than
merely to provide more abstraction and theory. 29 Examining the reality of
women's experiences has been the means by which feminists have tried to
alter the abstraction upon which the law is based. Abstraction is also the
means by which individuals formulate stereotype.3°  One means of
disestablishing stereotype is also by providing context and disconfirming
information.3'
Part II explores the nature and formation of stereotype and how social
power drives the formation and perpetuation of stereotype. Society uses
stereotype as a tool for controlling the relative status of groups, such as
African Americans and women, and of individuals, such as victims of
domestic abuse. Stereotypes of race and/or gender depend upon and reinforce
28See, e.g., Schecter, supra note 27; Olsen, supra note 20.
29 Seee.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a
Woman's Lawyering Process, I Berkeley Women's L.J. 39,48 (1985) (remarking that "[men]
focus on universal abstract principles like justice, equality and fairness so that their world is
safe, predictable and constant. Women solve problems by seeking to understand the context and
relationships involved and understand that universal rules may be impossible."); Mari J.
Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique
of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N. Mex. L. Rev. 613,619 (1986) ("The refusal to acknowledge
context-to acknowledge the actual lives of human beings affected by a particular abstract
principle-has meant time and again that women's well-grounded, experiential knowledge is
subordinated to someone else's false abstract presumptions."); Robin West, Jurisprudence and
Gender, 55 U. Chi. L.Rev. 1, 58 (1988) ("By the claim that modern jurisprudence is
'masculine,' I mean... that the values, the dangers ... that characterize women's lives are not
reflected at any level whatsoever.... The values that flow from women's material potential for
physical connection are not recognized.").
o See Hamilton, et al., supra note 18, at 295.
"Providing information that is counter-stereotypic enables people to change their
views and images of members of out-groups. See Hewstone, supra note 18; Walter G. Stephan,
A Cognitive Approach to Stereotyping in Stereotyping and Preiudice: Changing Conceptions
(Daniel Bar-Tal, et al. eds., 1989).
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each other, and serve as justifications for the perpetuation of violence. In
addition, sex and sexuality are integral to the power dynamic enabling the
formation of these stereotypes. Finally, the stereotypes associated with
domestic violence and victimhood, also dependent upon race and gender
stereotypes, condition the environment, both within the home and in society,
for the acceptance of physical violence. This section concludes with an
analysis of how stereotypes affect mainstream perceptions ofjury verdicts and
justice.
In Part II, I discuss the dynamic of social power and how the position
of power in social relationships explains the operation of stereotypes. This
section explores the relationship between normative understandings,
essentialist approaches, and stereotypes. It examines how portrayals of the
interests of different social groups, and different aspects of individual identity,
serve to maintain social hierarchy. I explore the portrayal and perception of
"victim" as a primary tool in this dynamic.
Part IV is an example of dismantling stereotypes through context so
that real differences are understood and justice achieved. Providing context
and actually hearing perspectives outside your own, are key to challenging the
ready acceptance of stereotypes. In this section, I explore the possible
contexts from which black women may have reacted to issues of domestic
violence as presented in the O.J. trials. True understandings of other's
perspectives may well lead to a change in our normative applications. Finally,
this section explores possibilities for changing norms to avoid stereotypes.
This exploration includes an examination of existing legal procedural norms,
including rules of ethics, rules of evidence, and jury instructions, to mitigate
and eventually eliminate the prejudice of stereotypes within the judicial
process.
II. STEREOTYPES-POWER, SEX, GENDER, RACE
A. The Formation of Stereotypes
Violence has continuously been justified and perpetuated by the use
of stereotypes. Specifically, domestic violence is infused with the stereotypes
associated with race, gender and victimization. Racial stereotypes (often
[Vol. 8:1
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gender dependent) and gender stereotypes (usually race dependent) 32 are used
to qualify the meaning of the stereotypes associated with victimization.
Stereotypes serve as a proxy for the character of the person and for the
truth of a situation. With the use of a stereotype, we don't have to use the
effort to really know about a person or really understand her situation or the
ways in which that situation and the world affects her life. Stereotypes
maintain the status quo by preventing those who subscribe to those views from
adequately dealing with the situation, keeping the objects of the stereotypes
bound in their prescribed roles, and perpetuating misconceptions. Because
of the impersonal and general nature, stereotypes devalue their objects,
32 Stereotypes, born out of racist and sexist ideology, reinforce the oppressive nature
of each other. See Roberts, supra note 21, at 3 (1993) ("[Racism and patriarchy] are two
interrelated, mutually supporting systems of domination and their relationship is essential to
understanding the subordination of all women."); Audre Lorde. Sexism: An American Disease
in Blackface, in Sister Outsider (1984) ("The results of woman-hating in the Black community
are tragedies which diminish all Black people. These acts must be seen in the context of a
systematic devaluation of Black women within this society.").
I describe racial stereotypes as being often gender dependent because there are many
that are gender neutral. Since stereotypes for African Americans, in particular, were created as
a means of dehumanization, gendered androgyny served the function of dehumanization through
gender-neutral references similar to those used for chattel. See Patricia Hill Collins, Learning
From the Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought, 33 Social
Problems S14, S17 (December 1986).
I describe gender stereotypes as usually race dependent because the stereotypic
definitions of femininity and true womanhood were created for white women, explicitly
contrasted to the stereotypic definitions of black women. See infra text accompanying notes 68-
94. Nonetheless, despite the stark contrasts in the stereotypes, all women are subject to the
confines of the patriarchal order. To that extent, there are some unifying stereotypes for women
vis a vis men within a specific context.
33 Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman 14 (1979) (discussing affects of prejudicial
attitudes as described by psychologist William Ryan regarding the cultural deprivation
associated with race and poverty in Blaming the Victim (1976)).
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compounding the violence by re-victimizing the victim.34 Thus, the mere
existence of stereotypes is itself a form of violence.35
"' "It is often said that rape victims are raped twice--once by the rapist and once by
the legal system. If that is so, then battered women are battered three times-once by the
batterer, a second time by society and finally by the legal system. Traditional society blames
the victim of battering for 'deserving' the punishment." Littleton, supra note 27, at 28-29.
This discussion is premised on the understanding that all violence against women is
of the same nature, manifesting in different degrees and kind. See infra text accompanying
notes 61-63. This being the case, literature concerning all kinds of violence against women,
especially rape, is used as support within this article.
Rape is a helpful paradigm because it captures the ways that many women
respond to sexual abuse and the way that law shapes the treatment of the
few courageous women who do come forward. In sexual harassment as
well as in rape, it is the woman rather than the accuser who is on trial. The
inquiry is animated by myths about women, about assumptions regarding
our veracity, about our integrity, and even about our grasp upon reality.
Rape law traditionally, and sexual harassment currently, focuses on
women's conduct, and character of the perpetrator.
Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Race Gender and Sexual Harassment, 65 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1467, 1469 (1992).
This analysis may also be extended to domestic violence.
In a similar way, violence of all kinds is unified in its root essence of power and
control.
... I believe that violence is inextricably linked to all acts of violence in this
society that occur between the powerful and the powerless, the dominant
and the dominated. While male supremacy encourages the use of abusive
force to maintain male domination of women, it is the Western
philosophical notion of hierarchical rule and coercive authority that is the
root cause of violence against women, of adult violence against children,
of all violence between those who dominate and those who are dominated.
It is this belief system that is the foundation on which sexist ideology and
other ideologies of group oppression are based; they can be eliminated only
when this foundation is eliminated.
bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center 118 (1984).
35 In discussing how legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition of
violence upon others, Robert Cover suggests a distinction between the violence imposed by the
legal system and the figurative violence inflicted by poets, critics, or artists in their work.
Robert M. Cover, Violence and The Word, 95 Yale L. J. 1601 1609 (1986). In the first
instance, I am suggesting a form of figurative violence. Nevertheless, the figurative violence
I am suggesting is more closely analogous to that of legal interpretation suggested by Cover.
Whereas Cover is discussing the facilitation of violence through formalized institutional roles,
I am discussing the facilitation of violence through informal, yet socially accepted, norms that
"condition effective domination," Id. at 1616 (emphasis in original), and are supported by the
operation of these formal institutions. See Minow, supra note 25, at 1671. The analogy is
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Stereotypes may include attitudes that are both positive and negative
associations with an out-group.3 6 However, I have limited my discussion to
stereotypes without directly considering the operation of prejudice. There is
a close relationship between stereotype and prejudice in psychology literature
and analyses, but they are generally treated separately.37 Prejudice generally
includes only the negative attitudes toward an out-group.38
Indeed, stereotypes may also serve a useful function to the extent that
they facilitate processing of large volumes of information39 in rational ways.
For example, it is useful and rational to make an initial assumption that
children are less capable of taking care of themselves than adults, even though
some children are perfectly capable of taking care of themselves and some
adults are not.
Nonetheless, even though stereotypes may include positive
associations, I discuss it only in negative terms for two reasons. First, what
is considered a positive association is socially constructed and dependent upon
the perspective of the observer. Second, and more importantly, stereotypes
serve as a representation of a group of individuals that may not be true for a
particular person, forcing her into a particular role and position, either
ideologically or in reality. I view these constrictors as negative.
complete with the realization that there is a real connection between the literal and figurative
nature of violence. See Robert Wieberg, Private Violence as Moral Action: The Law as
Inspiration and Example in Law's Violence (Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns, eds., 1992)
(arguing that the force of law operates as an inspiration for imitation outside the boundaries of
the law). Finally, the violence of legal interpretation is implicated just as strongly when there
is a lack of interpretive act, permissively maintaining the existence of societal violence.
36 Stroeb and Insko, supra note 18, at 4-8; Shalom H. Schwartz and Naomi Struch,
Values, Stereotypes, and Intergroup Antagonism in Stereotyping and Preiudice: Changing
Conception 151 (Daniel Bar-Tal, et al. eds., 1989).
" See generally, Stroeb and lnsko, supra note 18.
381 Id. at 8-10.
39 See Hamilton, etal., supra note 18, at 311; Yaacov Trope, Stereotype Dispositional
Judgment in Stereotyping and Preiudice: Chaning Conceptions 133 (Daniel Bar-Tal, et al. eds.,
1989) ("From a cognitive perspective, stereotypes are inevitable consequences of the limitations
of human information processing capabilities and the complexity of social reality"); see
generally, Susan T. Fiske and Steven L. Newberg, Category-Based and Individuating Processes
as a Function of Information and Motivation: Evidence From Our Laboratory in Stereotyping
and Preiudice: Changing Conceptions (Daniel Bar-Tal, et al. eds., 1989).
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Stereotype formation is based both in social-structural and individual
psychological processes.' These two bases are intimately related in the
perpetuation of stereotypes. In our cognitive processes, we categorize for
simplicity and organization. Stereotypes are just cognitive associations of
traits within particular social groups. Subsuming an entirety into a
singularity4' is the essence of stereotype,42 providing the easy way out of
assessing real difference and providing perspectives outside of one's own
perceptions. Because a stereotype is often intended to describe the antithesis
of the formulator of the stereotype, as much as to represent the social traits
of others,43 these associations tend to be formed in oppositional structures."
"[N]egative attributes of the self or of one's in-group come to be perceived as
characteristics of members of some out group."4 5  Since cognitively,
categorization is inevitable,46 we can postulate that a stereotype roughly
correlates to one side of a pair in what is regarded as conceptual opposites in
o See Hamilton, etal., supra note 18; Hewstone, supra note 18.
4' See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
12 See Hamilton, et al., supra note 18, at 295 ("Stereotypes undermine the perception
of within-group variability.").
43 See Stroebe and Insko, supra note 18, at 5.
"See Hamilton and Sherman, supra note 26, at 59 (describing how a "cognitive bias,
called an illusory correlation, refers to an erroneous judgment of the relationship between two
variables.").
"' Hamilton, et al., supra note 18, at 293 (explaining that from a psychodynamic
perspective, stereotypes serve the motivational needs of the perceiver, through the use of defense
mechanisms, such as projection and displacement).
"Id., at 311 ("The cognitive approach to stereotyping has emphasized the role of
categorization in stereotyping.... categorization is both ubiquitous and highly functional;
without it, we would have difficulty functioning in a world that inundates us with countless
pieces of information."). See generally, Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty (G. Anscombe and
G. Von Wright eds., 1974); George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (1987).
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classic dichotomous thinking:47  bad/good; black/white; lies/truth;
whore/virgin; castrator/victim; dominance/subordination, 9 to name a few."
Social power, its acquisition and maintenance, is the driving force
behind the formulation of stereotypes. 1 Control over the definition of
acceptable sexuality is one of the principal means of establishing power.52 In
47 Since stereotypes are viewed as cognitive structures, we can assume that they
influence information processing in the same general ways that other general knowledge does.
See Yoram Bar-Tal, Can Leaders Change Followers Stereotypes? in Stereotypine and Prejudice:
Changing Conceptions 225 (Daniel Bar-Tal, et al. eds.). Thus, it is consistent to view the
formation of stereotype as a part of the development in Western thought and philosophy. As
Frances Olsen explains, "[s]ince the rise of classical liberal thought, and perhaps since the time
of Plato, most of us have structured our thinking around a complex series of dualisms, or
opposing pairs: rational/irrational; active/passive; thought/feeling; reason/emotion;
culture/nature; power/sensitivity; objective/subjective; abstract/contextualized;
principled/personalized. These dualistic pairs divide things into contrasting spheres or polar
opposites," Frances Olsen, Feminism and Critical Legal Theory: An American Perspective, 18
Int'l J. Sociology L. 199 (1990); see also, Olsen, supra note 20, at 1575-76 (1983).
48 See Estrich, supra note 27, at 27-41(1987); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race, amd
Representation: The Power of Discourse, Discourse of Power, and the Reconstruction of
Heterosexuality, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 869, 929-945 (1996).
49 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 137 (1989).
50 In this discussion, I specifically explore the dichotomies of black and white and
male and female and some of the ways in which stereotype operates concerning them. As with
any dichotomy, the two extremes seldom encompass the "shades of gray." Internal to each
dichotomy are a range of possibilities. Certainly there are many people who are both black and
white and encompassing the degrees of the spectrum. Male and female are also not the only
possibilities as many individuals may identify with their apparent gendered opposite, identify
with both, neither, and the range of possibilities in between. And of course, each of us as
individuals encompass both "feminine" and "masculine" qualities.
Despite the relegation of this point to a footnote, I do not wish to marginalize the
effects of stereotypes not discussed here. Although there are similarities in the use of stereotype
to maintain or assert social power, stereotype affects different races, ethnicities, religious
affiliations, sexual identity, and class strata or disability in different ways.
5 This "driving force" may be blatant and calculated or deliberately subconscious
with the desire to maintain the status quo. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id. the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 326, 328-344
(1987) (describing how unconscious motivations are dependent upon an "ideology [as] a
defense mechanism against the anxiety felt by those who hold power through means and with
motives that they cannot comfortably acknowledge.").
" Implicitly sexuality, and concomitantly beauty standards, have always been key to
defining the stereotypes associated with both race and gender. "Race, gender and sexuality
converge on [the] issue of evaluating beauty. Judging white women by their physical
appearance and attractiveness to men objectifies them. But their white skin and straight hair
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the case of race, gender, and domestic violence, stereotype has served as a
fundamental tool in effectuating this end.53
The structure and formation of stereotypes is of the same character as
"normative" approaches and "essentialist" approaches, in that all three are
intended to reflect a standardized embodiment of reality. The normative
approach presumes a neutral and objective position. Normative ideals tend to
be based on unstated male standpoints and frames of reference, effectively
belying notions of neutrality and objectivity.54 Notions of a universal
perspective undermine the soundness of the normative approach. Rather than
merely presuming the neutral, objective, universal perspective, the normative
approach also rejects anything outside that "norm," emphasizing it as deviant
through exaggeration and stereotype. Some feminist writers, in their efforts
to challenge "male norms," have asserted the "woman's point of view." In
doing so they have only accounted for the "essential" woman's standpoint,
universalizing perspective in much the same way as the normative approach.55
Any approach that defines "self' from only one perspective, consequently
excludes the perspectives of "others. 56
privilege them in a system in which part of the basic definition of whiteness is its superiority to
blackness." Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the
Politics of Empowerment 79-80 (1990). See also, Harris, supra note 12, at 596-98.
" Stereotype serves to denigrate and dehumanize its object and is ultimately used as
a mode of control. See Collins, supra note 32, at SI 7. One of the functions of stereotype in
intergroup relations is "delegitimization," which may operate to deny a categorized group's
humanity. See Daniel Bar-Tal, Delegitimization: The Extreme Code of Stereotyping and
Prejudice in Stereotyping and Prejudice: Changing Conceptions 169, 171 (Daniel Bar-Tal et al.
eds., 1989).
54 Martha Minow discusses how feminists have shown that the presumptions of
neutrality within the law are in fact based on a male norm, and treat the male perspective as
natural and necessary. Minow, supra note 21, at 48.
5' Minow chastises feminists for replicating the faults of the approach they criticize:
making normative assumptions about the "woman's" perspective, marginalizing "others." Id.
Understanding that it can function both as a means of legitimation and a means of resistence,
essentialism, unlike the normative, operates to point out its own difference from the norm (in
the resistence function) and to exclude the differences of others (in its legitimation function).
See generally Fuss, supra note 21.
56 See Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
Harv. L.Rev. 10, 14 (1987) ("Regardless of which perspective ultimately seems persuasive, the
possibility of multiple viewpoints challenges the assumption of objectivity and shows how
claims to knowledge bear the imprint of those making the claims."). In effect, the standardized
approaches are stereotypes of "self."
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Stereotypes, on an individual or collective basis, are a means of
defining "self' by deflecting certain characteristics onto "others."57 Thus,
both normative and essentialist approaches are dependent upon the existence
of stereotypes to confirm their entitlement to the normative position. Thus,
when I describe the operation of stereotypes, I necessarily discuss a
component of normative or essentialist approaches. Stereotypes of black
women bring to the fore the connection between these two approaches.
Angela Harris demonstrates how, whereas in a contemporary male
supremacist system, black women are something less than women, in a
peculiar symmetry, essentialist dominance feminism recasts black women as
something more than women.5" In this manner, feminism, like the normative
approach, has served to reinforce certain stereotypes by not being inclusive.
Frances Olsen's work, focusing primarily on the conceptual ways in
which the law operates to subordinate women, has demonstrated that inherent
in dichotomous, oppositional structures are power hierarchies where one part
of the pair is considered superior. She describes these dualisms as
"sexualized" in how they constitute hierarchy, with each of the two halves as
either "masculine" or "feminine."5 9 This hierarchization corresponds to the
conceptual approach to stereotype whereby the perception of out-groups is
less favorable, making one's in-group "better" than other groups. 6° This
understanding is important as the conceptual, including the ideology of
stereotypes, informs and determines social reality and the operation of the
current legal regime.
Catharine MacKinnon's work, which has been a focal point of
feminist discourse, has made it a given that the ideological boundaries to
sexuality are fundamental to gender, that gender is fundamental to those
57 See supra text accompanying note 40.
58 Harris, supra note 12, at 596.
'9 Olsen, supra note 47. To the extent that this is intended to describe the power
structure inherently conferred by dualisms, this is accurately applied to the dualisms of the
stereotypes discussed here. See also Collins, supra note 32, at S20 ("[d]ichotomous
oppositional differences invariably imply relationships of superiority and inferiority, hierarchical
relationships that mesh with political economies of domination and subordination"); Stephan,
supra note 31, at 40-41; Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv.L. Rev. 1331,1370-74
(1988) (describing the oppositional dualities of black and white images in a white hegemonic
system); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adiudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1685 (1976) (using oppositional dualities to explain opposing tendencies in the law).
o Hamilton et al., supra note 18, at 293.
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boundaries,6' and that our culture eroticizes dominance. 62 Her work has
demonstrated that male dominance and assertions of power over women and
their sexuality is the unifying and precipitating factor of violence against
women. This includes rape, pornography, sexual harassment, and battery.63
Specifically, domestic battery is a means for the batterer to get what he wants;
a means to control the behavior of his victim so that she conforms to his
expectations and societal expectations of the "true woman."
Not often discussed are the ways in which race is part of our sexual
culture and integral to that culture of dominance. Racial stereotypes are
infused with sexual meaning. As Cornell West describes these stereotypes,
...the dominant myths draw black women and men either as
threatening creatures who have the potential for sexual power over
whites, or as harmless, desexed underlings of a white culture.
There is Jezebel (the seductive temptress), Sapphire (the evil,
manipulative bitch), or Aunt Jemima (the sexless, long-suffering
nurturer). There is Bigger Thomas (the mad and mean predatory
craver of white women), Jack Johnson (the super performer-be it
in athletics, entertainment, or sex-who excels others naturally and
prefers women of a lighter hue), of Uncle Tom (the spineless,
sexless--or is it impotent?-side-kick of whites).64
6" MacKinnon, supra note 49, at 126-154.
62 Id.
63 "Male dominance is sexual. Meaning: men in particular, if not men alone, sexualize
hierarchy; gender is one. As much a sexual theory of gender as a gendered theory of sex, this
is the theory of sexuality that has grown out of conscious raising. Recent feminist work, both
interpretive and empirical, on rape, battery, sexual harassment, sexual abuse of children,
prostitution and pornography, support it." Id. at 127 (citations omitted). See also, MacKinnon,
supra note 20, at 85; Diana Scully, Understanding Sexual Violence 166-169 (1994) (noting that
sexual violence and all its manifestations are the inevitable consequence of patriarchal social
structure).
' Cornell West, Race Matters 119-20 (1993); see also, Nell Irvin Painter, Hill
Thomas, and the Use of Racial Stereotype, in Race-ing Justice, En-gendering Power 200 (Toni
Morrison ed. 1992); see also Amii Barnard, The Application of Critical Race Feminism to the
Anti-Lynching Movement: Black Women's Fight Against Race and Gender Ideology, 1892-
1920, 3 UCLA Women's L.J. 1, 9-13 (1993) (discussing the myth of the black rapist and the
myth of the promiscuous black woman); Adele Alexander, "She's No Lady, She's A Nigier":
Abuses, Stereotypes, and Realities from the Middle Passage to Capitol (and Anita) Hill in Race,
Gender, and Power in America 5 (Anita Faye Hill and Emma Coleman Jordan eds., 1995).
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The stereotypes of gender and race are unified around the common axis of
sexuality. The themes of race, gender, and control of sexuality also interact
in ways that have determined the development of the recognition of domestic
violence.65  The unified means of control, defining the appropriate
manifestations of sexuality, culminate in an ideology of control, which I call
"lynch mob ideology."66 This terminology is particularly appropriate as I




The violence of lynch mob ideology has been the precipitating factor
in the formation of racialized gender stereotypes68 and has been both a literal
and conceptual means of controlling both women and African Americans. I
state its structure in this way, precisely because it demonstrates further the
literal and conceptual control of black women, who, by the choice of the text,
65 Reva Siegel points out that one of the first cases repudiating the right of
chastisement was Fulgham v. State 46 Ala. 143 (1887), where an emancipated slave was
indicted for assault and battery for striking his wife, also emancipated, with a board to the back
of the head. In discussing the implications of this case, Siegel asks the very insightful question,
"Was it to ensure that the woman was not treated like a 'slave,' or to prevent her recently
emancipated husband from asserting the 'privileges' of a master?" Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule
of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117, 2135 (1996). She also
points out that as legal penalties for wife beating emerged, it was poor, immigrant, and African-
American men who were most prosecuted, despite the prevalence of domestic violence in all
social classes and ethnicities. Id. at 2138-2140.
' I explore history only to the extent it explains the development of the currently
prevailing stereotypes. Once formed, stereotypes have a life of their own, persisting long after
the original time and intention of their formation. See Stroeb and Insko, supra note 18, at 16.
67 Stereotypes and the general manner in which they function to delegitimate are
culturally bound. See D. Bar-Tal, supra note 53.
" In theory, you might question whether sexism would exist without racism, or
whether racism would exist without sexism. This is an empty inquiry without real historical
context. All modem societies exhibit forms of racism and patriarchy, albeit manifesting and
interacting in ways different from those in American society.
All forms of oppression are unified in the quest for social power and control. In this
sense, both racism and sexism, both independently and in chorus, were born of the same genitor.
Classism and social stratification must also be viewed from this understanding. Though the
stereotypes associated with race, gender, and victimhood are the focus of this discussion,
classism should also be considered as it influences the formation and interaction of these
stereotypes.
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are simultaneously included in both categories yet disappear from explicit
consideration.69 In addition, this construction demonstrates the omnipresence
of patriarchy and white supremacy, in that white men are explicitly excluded
from both categories and comprise the unstated norm from which the original
statement is meant to deviate.7°
Most literally, lynch mob ideology has been a means of controlling the
power of black men and their sexual access to women, both black and white;
access to white women denied completely7' and access to black women only
as permitted by white men.72 While white men enjoyed sexual access to both
white and black women, "consensual sexual intercourse between a white
woman and a Black man was the ultimate symbol of Black and white equality
and a direct threat to the racial hierarchy of the post-war South.' '73 Lynchings
were justified by the pervasive stereotype that "Black male sexuality [was]
wanton and bestial, and that Black men [were] wild, criminal rapists of white
69 See generally, Crenshaw, supra note 34; see also, hooks, supra note 12; see
generally, All the Women are White, All the Blacks are Men, But Some of Us Are Brave (Gloria
T. Hull, et al. eds., 1982) (specifically compiled to academically address the experiences of
black women).
70 In fact, I do not discuss the stereotypes associated with white men as these
stereotypes are most commonly understood as normative expectations. See Minow, supra note
21, at 47 (discussing how the male norm has been treated as neutral and as the universal
perspective).
7' Rape of a white woman was the most common justification for the lynching of black
men. See Ida B. Wells, Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in All Its Phases (1892), reprinted in On
Lynchings (1969) [hereinafter Wells, Southern Horrors . Even though such a rape seldom
actually occurred, "[b]y incorporating common racial and gender stereotypes, this justification
successfully masked the true identity of lynching as an instrument of Black subjugation wielded
by whites." Barnard, supra note 64 at 2; see also, Ida B. Wells, A Red Record 58-70 (1894),
reprinted in On Lynchings (1969) [hereinafter Wells, A Red Record]; Brownmiller, supra note
27, at 210-255; Wriggins, supra note 27.
72 This conceptualization of women as property, subject to access and control by men,
is the unifier of women within feminist theory that most transcends difference. Nonetheless, this
conceptualization also manifests to different degrees when considering race and class.
73 Barnard, supra note 64 at 11; see also, Brownmiller, supra note 27, at 220.
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women." 74 Now, even though literal lynchings are no longer a common
75 76occurrence, this ideology and conceptualization continues.
Since it is also a means of controlling the actions and behavior of
white women, 77 the effectiveness of lynch mob ideology is dependent on the
perpetuation of dual stereotypes of them. White women have historically been
characterized as "feminine, i.e. 'small,' 'delicate,' 'soft,' and 'light.' She may
also be 'dull, peaceful, relaxed, cold, rounded, passive and slow.' She is also
portrayed as the ideal housewife, and the symbol of love and motherhood. ' T
This is the ideal woman and the stereotypic "good girl." If a woman does not
meet these expectations then she is not a "true woman," and thus a "bad girl."
The "good girl" deserves protection, especially from the stereotypic black
man. Any woman who deviates from the "good girl" image is thus a "bad
girl" and not deserving of protection. This dichotomy is itself a form of
74 Wriggins, supra note 27, at 108. The dehumanizing effect of stereotype involves
categorizing a group as subhuman or as superhuman beasts such as demons, monsters, and
satans. See D. Bar-Tal, supra note 53, at 172.
75 Lynchings may no longer be common, but racial animus still motivates race-based
hate-crimes. See e.g., Mike Allen, Human Tragedy or Inhuman Cruelty?/Virginia Town
Struggles With Possibility of Racism in Alleged Killing of Black Man, Washington Post, Aug.
3, 1997, at BOl (where two white men were charged with the murder of a black Marine veteran
by dousing him with gasoline, burning him alive, then beheading him with an axe).
76 In a recent case, "A Michigan probate judge, discussing the Michigan law under
which minors seeking abortions may request a waiver of the parental consent requirement, stated
that he was reluctant to grant waivers, but might do so 'in some cases such as incest or when a
white girl is raped by a black man."' Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases,
67 Tul. L. Rev. 1739, 1749, n. 29 (1993) (citing, Judge Cites Interracial Rape in Abortion
Debate, UPI, Apr. 26, 1991 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File).
This imagery has contributed to the stereotypic conceptualization of the believability
of male violence against women. In discussing her own rape, Susan Estrich points out that hers
was a "real rape" because she was a "nice (white) girl" whose rapist was a strange black man.
Estrich supra note 27, at 1-7 ("The history of rape in the Unites States is clearly a history of
both racism and sexism. It is impossible to write about rape without addressing racism...").
Another indication that racist concepts and stereotypes are internalized is a recent
Gallup poll indicating that 61% of whites approve of black-white marriages. Most reporting on
this poll characterized it as positive since the percentage was up from 45% in 1994 and a bare
4% in 1958. See, e.g., Haya El Nasser, Poll: Whites Increasingly Accept Blacks, USA Today,
Jun. 11,1997, at IA. Where the increase in ratings is positive, I wonder if some pollees included
in that 61% are just saying what they think they should, and wonder even more about the
remaining 39%. After all, this is not just an inadvertent racist comment.
7 Brownmiller, supra note 27, at 220.
71 Mae C. King, The Politics of Sexual Stereotypes, 4 Black Scholar 12, 15 (Mar.-Apr.
1973) (citations omitted).
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violence. The forced comportment with the "good girl" stereotype is a
limitation of women's free existence.79
Logically, intertwined with the "good girl" stereotype is the
perception of victimhood.8s As Susan Brownmiller points out, "[tihe psychic
burden under which women function is weighted by a deep belief, borne out
by ample evidence, that our attractiveness to men, our sexual desirability, is
in direct proportion to our ability to play the victim." Only "good girls,"
expected to be both chaste and truthful, can be victims. In the world of
stereotype, only chaste women are truthful. Thus, for a white woman, her
veracity is directly tied to the realization of her sexuality, in a way that it is not
for men.8 In accordance with lynch mob ideology, truth is a double edged
sword for white women. If they didn't lie about being raped by a black man,
they were labeled whores and liars; if they cried rape and played their role in
the system of domination over black men, they were in fact liars.8 2 White
79 See Olsen supra note 47, at 200 ("[Men] have also placed [white] women on a
pedestal and treasured them in a fantasy world....simultaneously exalt[ing] and degrad[ing]
women...").
8
0 See Brownmiller, supra note 27, at 333. When Susan Estrich tells her story of rape,
she remarks that, "[wihen I tell my story, no one doubts my status as victim." She makes this
observation from a context of a white woman being raped by a black man. She also remarks
that, "[h]is being black...probably makes my account more believable to some people ......
Estrich, supra note 27, at 3.
8" See Wriggins, supra note 27, at 126 ("...chastity was thought to bear on the
woman's general character, and, hence, on her credibility. A woman's propensity for falsehood
was assumed to increase proportionately to her sexual experience.").
82 See Wells, A Red Record, supra note 71, at 60; Brownmiller, supra note 27, at 234
(discussing the infamous "wolf whistle" murder of Emmett Till, a fourteen year old boy who
was beaten, shot in the head, had a weight tied around his head, and was dumped into the
Talahatchie River for whistling at a white woman). For a full historical account of the death of
Emmett Till, see Stephen J. Whitfield, A Death in the Delta: The Story of Emmett Till (1988).
Another infamous mark in our history is the convictions of nine black youngsters, aged thirteen
to twenty for raping two white women, based almost exclusively on the women's allegation.
See Dan T. Carter, Scottsboro: A Tragedy of the American South (1979).
Susan Brownmiller notes that the persecution of black men does not relieve them from
their support of a patriarchal order or the objectification of women. See Brownmiller, supra
note 27, at 247. She also notes the irony of the standard defense strategy of campaigns to save
the lives of black men convicted of raping white women, which was to impugn the reputation
of the alleged victim "by smearing her as mentally unbalanced, or as sexually frustrated, or as
an oversexed, promiscuous whore." Id. at 238. On the other side of the coin, Angela Harris
notes that the oppressive nature of patriarchy does not relieve white women of the responsibility
of their complicity in a social structure that perpetuates a system of oppression of people of
color. See Harris, supra note 12, at 60; see also, Wells, A Red Record, supra note 71, at 80-90
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women who chose to have sex with black men, 3 or any sexual relations
outside the bonds of marriage, were in danger of being labeled prostitutes and
liars and of being socially outcast. Thus, white women, whether "good girls"
or "bad girls" are stereotypically considered less credible than white men.
Lynch mob ideology is also dependent on the concept of permissible
sexual access of white men to black women. 4 To meet this end, the
stereotype of black women was that they were immoral and less deserving of
protection from violence or sexual exploitation. 5 The stereotyping of black
women supported the image of the "masculinized sub-human creatures" that
could not be true women. 6 Black women have historically been characterized
as:
tough, hard-working domestics who assume the role of matriarch in
the home but somehow always manage to know their place and
remain appropriately submissive in the white world.... As the
"matriarch," she is dominant in the black family and
psychologically castrates the black man.... She is characterized as
a depreciated sex object; sexually objectified, yet denied the
(discussing the disassociation of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union with the anti-
lynching campaign because of accusations implicating white women).
83 Ida B. Wells noted that "there [were] white women in the South who love the Afro-
American's company even as there are white men notorious for their preference for Afro-
American women." Wells, Southern Horrors, supra note 71, at 11. Nonetheless, such liaisons
have continued to be frowned upon within society, conditioning the acceptance of the relevant
stereotypes. Only thirty years ago was the legality of miscegenation laws denounced by our
Supreme Court. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); see also, supra note 76.
" See Wriggins, supra note 27, at 120-21 ("These attitudes reflect a set of myths about
Black women's supposed promiscuity which were used to excuse white men's sexual abuse of
Black women.").
85 Uncatalogued rapings of black women, in slavery and then in their employers
kitchen, did not precipitate lynchings. See Wriggins, supra note 27, at 117-23; hooks, supra
note 34, at 1-4; Wells, Southern Horrors, supra note 71, at 11-12. In fact, there are recorded
instances of black women being lynched. See Kendall Thomas, Strange Fruit in Race-ing
Justice, Engendering Power 370 (Toni Morison, ed., 1992) ("In addition to suffering the rape
and other forms of sexual terror, a number of black females lost their lives at the hands of lynch
parties."); Wells, Southern Horrors, supra note 71, at 13-4, 24.
86 bell hooks, supra note 12, at 71.
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political power and equality derived from the partnership of
marriage (with white men).87
Stereotypes of black women were the key to controlling all women,
black or white. The ultimate symbol of equality between the sexes is the
ability to do the same work.88 Enslaved black women performed the same
tasks as their male counterparts while still fulfilling traditional female roles.
Therefore, necessarily, the stereotypes for black women were opposite those
for white women, and directly correlated with the "bad girl" stereotype.
"According to governing stereotypes, chastity could not be possessed by Black
women," 89 which, of course, meant they could not be truthful. The inability
to be perceived as chaste, the absence of the appearance of truthfulness, and
the attribute of strength, characteristic of the stereotype for black women and
contrary to the stereotype of frailty for white women, are also directly opposed
to the stereotypes for victimhood. Thus, the prevailing stereotypes of black
women do not allow them to fit within the stereotype of the "good girl" or
87 King, supra note 78, at 16-17. See also, Alexander, supra note 64, at 18 (discussing
"the familiar stereotypes of America's black women, be they Mammy or Prissy, Jezebel, Topsy,
or Eliza, Sapphire, 'red-hot mama,' 'tragic mulatto,' 'welfare queen,' 'superwoman,' or
'emasculating matriarch"').
Contemporary illustrations of these stereotypes are ever present. For example, a
recent New York Times Magazine cover, depicting the story, It Takes a Village to Reform
Welfare, shows the welfare recipient as a dark-skinned black woman with her three children (the
caption for her reads: "The Welfare Recipient (with Children): Has ajob but can she keep it?");
the employment counselor as a light-skinned black woman; and the reformers and architects of
change in the welfare system as three white men in suits and ties. The New York Times
Magazine, Aug. 24, 1997. Not only does this indicate the continued existence of the "welfare
queen" stereotype, but also points out that the most accepted stereotype associated with poverty
is blackness. Since the majority of people who are in poverty are white, this is a stereotype. See
Martina Shea, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Dynamics of Economic Well-
Being: Poverty 1990 to 1992, at 6 [hereinafter Dynamics of Poverty .
8" During the nascent stages of the feminist movement, having the opportunity to work
was the essence of equality for women; it then evolved into the recognition of women's ability
to do the same work as men. The modem struggle of feminist activists is for equal
compensation for the same work, both financially and in status recognition. Fundamentally,
these foci has not considered the social position of black women or poor women who have
always worked and have always been expected to do so. See hooks, supra note 34, at 1-4
(discussing Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (1963)).
89 See Wriggins, supra note 27, at 126.
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"victim," making interactions with the justice system that much more
complicated.9"
In addition, the popular conceptualization of the "black male offender/
white female victim,"9' not only creates a collective belief that black men are
responsible for all of the violence in society, but also minimizes and denies the
seriousness of violence against women that does not fit within this paradigm.92
Because the ability of women to obtain justice is so dependent upon their
ability to be perceived as a "victim" by meeting the stereotypic expectations,
both in character and situation, gender stereotypes serve as a powerful means
of social control.93
Within the framework of "lynch-mob" ideology, stereotype serves to
scapegoat some (black men); re-victimize others (white women); formulate the
disappearance of many (black women); and relieve most everyone else (white
9 See Note, Clemency For Clemency For Killers? Pardoning Battered Women Who
Strikes Back, 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 297,319-20 (1995) (discussing how black battered women
have difficulty meeting "good battered woman" stereotypes and are less likely to benefit from
testimony on the battered woman syndrome). Especially in considering the battered women's
syndrome, its initial rejection by the courts was criticized by feminists for adhering strictly to
a male norm in establishing self defense. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and
Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9
Women's Rts L. Rep. 195 (1986). There is still much persuasion necessary to convince a jury
to disregard the male norm. Considering this in conjunction with the conceptualization of the
"victim" as being a white woman, who is a "good girl," stereotype continues to be an
impediment to justice.
9' See Wriggins, supra note 27. at 120. But see, Catharine Clinton, "With a Whip in
His Hand": Rape, Memory, and African American Women, in History and Memory in African-
American Culture 205 (Genevieve Fabre and Robert O'Meally eds., 1994) ("Despite the
incontrovertible evidence that only a small fraction of rapes are interracial, race continues to
inflame the issue and to obscure the fact that African American Women are represented in rape
statistics in dangerously disproportionate numbers. In America today, a black woman is six
times more likely to be raped than a white woman.") (emphasis in original).
92 See Wriggins, supra note 27, at 125. Obtaining victim status is often dependent on
an individual's ability to fit within a particular identity, which is often treated as if it were
reducible to a single trait. See Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1411, 1432;
cf. supra note 27.
9' In much the same way, an innocent black man's ability to obtain justice is
dependent upon his ability to avoid the perception of perpetrator. This is ironic since black
males are most likely to be victims in society. See Michael R. Rand and Kevin Strom, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Violence-Related Inuries Treated in Hospital Emergency Departments 3
(1997) [hereinafter Emergency Departments] ("The National Crime Victimization Survey
(NCVS) has consistently found that blacks, males, and persons age 15-24 are the most
vulnerable to become violent crime victims.").
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men) from responsibility. Thus, stereotype, by its mere existence and
operation is a conceptual means of violence that has served as a justifying
force in the perpetuation of literal violence.94
C. Domestic Violence-a Point of Culmination
Domestic violence has traditionally been relegated to the conceptual
realm of the private sphere, as opposed to the public market.95 Even though
the notion that domestic violence is a private matter has slowly been changing
over time,96 domestic violence is still a subject that we, as a society, prefer to
leave in private. 97 This preference allows us to be detached from "someone
else's problem" and avoid responsibility. Because we prefer to conceptualize
domestic violence as a private mater, the use of stereotype makes it easier for
us to further remove ourselves from the issues.
Violence, beyond the conceptual realm of stereotype, is a literal
means of control. Stereotype serves as the justification which allows us to put
things into their place within our normative expectations when the
presumptively deviant behavior of violence occurs. 98 On scale, domestic
abuse is the literal means of control within the family.99 Stereotype adds an
additional tool for control, both within family relations and in societal
perceptions that influence a woman's ability to get help and succeed in the
justice system.
94 See supra, note 35.
95 See Schneider, supra note 24; Olsen, supra note 20; Evan Stark, et al., Medicine
and Patriarchal Violence: The Social Construction of A 'Private' Event, 9 Int'l J. Health
Services 461 (1979).
96 See generally, Schneider, supra note 24. In addition, a strong indication that we
are moving toward conceptualizing violence against women as public acts is the enactment of
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
9 See Stark, et al., supra note 95.
98 Even though we generally do not include violence within our normative
expectations, this is closer to a collective wish than a normative reality. Violence has always
been an integral part of society, in its existence, its establishment of organized order, and its
maintenance of that order. See generally, Cover, supra note 35; Law's Violence (Austin Sarat
and Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992).
" See Susan Schecter, Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles of the
Battered Women's Movement 219-224 (1982).
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Whether or not someone subject to domestic abuse is considered a
"victim," is intimately connected to the "good girl/bad girl" stereotypes. The
stereotype of victimhood, implicitly infused with racialized gender
stereotypes, is central to the stereotypes of domestic abuse. Because sexuality
is implicit in the backdrop of relationships and families, it is the unifying
factor bringing domestic violence within the ambit of this overall framework
of violence. In other words, the race and gender infused stereotypic position
of a victim, constrains her relative social reality in ways that inflict conceptual
violence through the stereotype itself and condition the acceptance and
perpetuation of literal violence within her home and in society.
The stereotypes associated with domestic violence include that the
victim precipitates her own assault, that she is masochistic and either "likes"
or "deserves" to be beaten, that she is "crazy," that even if she leaves one
abusive relationship, she will just find another,"° and that she is free to end
her victimization at any time without assistance.'' This is contrary to "good
girls" who do not need to defend themselves; that is what their good (white)
male protectors are for.' 2 With this ideology circumscribing the perception
of women, by definition domestic abuse must have been "asked for," and thus
only levied against "bad girls." The mere fact that a woman is engaged in a
relationship where she is abused triggers the "bad girl" stereotype. Christine
Littleton most vividly describes how this stereotype operates in this regard:
If only she had been a better wife, a more submissive helpmate, a
more compliant sexual partner, then her nose would not have been
broken, her eye would still be uncut, the bruises would not have
10o An example of how this stereotype operates to the detriment of battered women is
in a 1991 Michigan termination of parental rights case. Sharon Benn, diagnosed with battered
women's syndrome, had her parental rights terminated because of the concern that she would
"enter into another abusive relationship, with resulting damage to her children if they were to
be returned to her,... based on the view that 'once a battered woman, always a battered woman."'
In the Matter of Farley, 437 Mich 992, 469 N.W.2d 295 (1991) (Levin, J. dissenting from an
order denying review).
1.. Lenore E. Walker, supra note 33, at 18-31 (1979). Unfortunately, the myths
described by Lenore Walker have endured and still persist today.
2 A woman in our society is socialized to believe that "she is, and ought to be, gentle
and weak and helpless; that she needs to be protected from pain and injury; that she cannot
really rely on her own strength to save her from danger; that male violence is profoundly to be
feared but cannot be defended against .... Cynthia K. Gillespie, Justifiable Homicide, 116
(1989).
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been broken, her eye would still be uncut, the bruises would never
have marked her thighs.1
03
A woman has to prove herself to be a "victim" before she can obtain
justice."° Given that violence against women has, in the least, sexual
overtones (making chastity an unspoken issue), and given that the stereotypes
for women paint them as less credible than men (especially where sexuality
is an issue), this is a monumental task.'0 5 Stereotype is a web that pulls in the
object of the violence, subjecting her further to violence: if she is in an
abusive relationship, she must have deserved it, even precipitated it, and is
therefore a "bad girl"; bad girls are not considered victims or deserving of
protection. If she fights back to protect herself, she is "too strong" 106 to be a
victim, or strong enough not to have been in that situation in the first place.
So, only a woman who is fortunate enough not to have someone beat on her,
or not strong enough to do something about it, is accorded the coveted status
of victim. 7
Although subject to deliberately opposing stereotypes, black women
and white women are subject to the same framework of conceptual and literal
violence that serves to victimize them both. Battered women, black and white,
have the additional burden of dealing with the control from physical violence
and the social limitations imposed by stereotype.'
103 Littleton, supra note 27, at 328.
'o4 See Gillespie, supra note 102, at 191 ("Women are apt to be regarded as inherently
less credible than men and, when they appear in court seeking justice as victims of violence,
they are frequently the targets of the most callous sort of victim blaming.").
105 See, e.g., Final Report of the Michigan Supreme Court Task Force on Gender
Issues in the courts 23, 81 (1989) [hereinafter Michigan Gender Reporti.
o Any woman who chooses to exhibit strength is not typically perceived of as a
"victim." This is a contributing factor in why the battered woman's syndrome is not readily
accepted as a valid state of mind in murder trials. See Littleton, supra note 27, at 332.
107 The status of "victim" is important as it is a means for claiming remedies from an
entitled position. See generally, Minow, supra note 92.
1o See Littleton, supra note 27, at 329-332 (describing the law's picture of battered
women); see generally Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bath Water, Racial
Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome,
1995 Wis. L.Rev. 1003 (specifically discussing the experiences in the justice system of black
women who have been battered); Michigan Gender Report, supra note 105, at 23-24, 3 1.
Of the Bar studies that include considerations of the interaction of race and gender,
the general conclusion is that race and gender influence people's experiences and perceptions
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In addition, victims of domestic abuse have the extra impediment of
the traditional relegation of "domestic issues" to the private sphere. Domestic
violence is, and needs to be, regarded as a matter of public concern. Aside
from a general policy objective of preventing the perpetuation of such
conduct, domestic violence exacts tremendous costs of both its victims and of
society. 19 In addition, our system of justice depends on the community's
of justice; the experiences of women as a group differ from those of men; the experiences of
white women and minority women, as groups, differ; the experience of white women differ from
those of white men; the experiences of minority women differ from those of minority men.
What is most telling about these reports is the gulf in perceptions of differential treatment
between the respondents, corresponding to their race and gender. See, e.g., Final Report of the
Special Committee on Gender to the D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race and Ethnic Bias,
in I The Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias Task Force Proiect in the D.C. Circuit (1995), reprinted
in 84 Geo. L.J. 1657, 1706-08, 1738-39 (1996) [hereinafter D.C. Federal Gender Report ; Final
Report of the Special Committee on Race and Ethnicity to the D.C. Circuit Task Force on
Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias in II The Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias Task Force Proiect in
the D.C. Circuit (1995), reprinted in 64 Geo. Wash L. Rev. 189, 263-324 (1996) [hereinafter
D.C. Federal Race and Ethnicity Reporti; Michigan Gender Report, supra note 105; Final
Report of the Michigan Supreme Court Task Force on Racial/Ethnic Issues in the Courts (1989)
[hereinafter Michigan Racial Report]. Unfortunately, these studies are based on attorney
surveys, not surveys of the litigants/defendants. Thus, conclusions about the treatment of lay
people within the justice system is based on second hand information and extrapolation.
09 The costs associated with domestic abuse are potentially phenomenal. If we assess
both the direct costs (including emergency room care, hospitalization, doctor visits, child
protective services, foster care, shelters and subsidized housing, police and court resources,
counseling, and property damage), indirect costs (including job loss and unemployment, lost
productivity, disruption of the work place by the batterer, lost home production, lost promotion
and advancement, loss of control over one's environment, alienation from friends, family, and
community, mortality), and transfer payments (though not considered a "cost" under economic
analyses, welfare payments to victims of domestic abuse diminish the resources available for
other public expenditures). See generally, Louise Laurence and Roberta Spalter-Roth, Institute
for Women's Policy Research, Measuring the Costs of Domestic Violence Against Women and
the Cost-Effectiveness of Interventions: An Initial Assessment and Proposals for Further
Research (1996).
Domestic crime against adults accounts for approximately $67 billion per year, almost
15% of the total crime costs. Ted R. Miller, Mark A. Cohen and Brain Wiersema, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Victim Costs and Consequences: A New Look (1996). Of all persons treated for
violence related injuries in U.S. hospital emergency departments, approximately 17% were
attributable to a spouse or ex-spouse, or current or former boyfriend or girlfriend. Emergency
Departments supra note 93 (noting that a higher percentage of women than men were injured
by someone with whom they shared an intimate relationship).
Of the violence perpetrated at the workplace, women are more likely to be attacked
by someone known to them, and five percent of all women attacked in the workplace are
victimized by a husband, ex-husband, boyfriend, or ex-boyfriend. Ronet Bachman, Ph.D., U.S.
Dep't Of Justice, Violence and Theft in the Workplace: A National Crime Victimization Survey
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sense of fairness. What can be disheartening is that the community's sense of
fairness is often informed by a belief in stereotypes developed well before a
case reaches the courtroom or garners media attention. When the violence
reaches the point where the justice system intervenes, stereotype and prejudice
affect courtroom dynamics and the ability to obtain justice.' Then,
courtroom lawyers may manipulate popular conceptions and stereotype."'
Therefore, the community needs to really understand the issues, prior to
intervention by the justice system. In addition, for the cases that do not reach
the courtroom, society is the jury judging the actors and permitting the
outcomes-accepting, without meaningful condemnation, the actions of the
abuser, while holding responsible the victim for staying in the relationship." 
2
In a symbiotic manner, the justice system has the ability to affect
society's perceptions of justice, just as the perceptions held within society
influence the achievement of justice." 3 For this reason, the actors in the
justice system have the highest responsibility to affect attitudes, prejudices,
and stereotypes as they affect the administration of justice. Manipulation of
stereotypes, for whatever end, perpetuates the concepts of violence and allows
the intendant continuation of literal violence.
Prevention of violence and victimization is just as important a
function of justice as our response to it. Lawyers are leaders in society and
(1994).
"' See generally, Ammons, supra note 108; Johnson, supra note 76.
". Lawyers will continue to manipulate stereotypes, unless we re-educate them and
society not to accept them. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides no
guidance on the use of stereotypes, save Canon 1, stating that "a lawyer should assist in
maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal profession." In fact, most attorneys view
the use of stereotype as fair game in representing their client zealously within the bounds of the
law, as stated in Cannon 7. See Johnson, supra note 76 at 1790-1792. Federal Rule of
Evidence 402, and corresponding state rules, cannot be viewed as sufficient restraints based on
the lack of probative value of stereotypes, if judges and lawyers accept stereotypic
representations as factual. See id. at 1770-1776. Even though lawyers are part of society and
subject to the same stereotypic beliefs, we can, and should, expect more from them. See e.g.,
D.C. Federal Gender Report, supra note 108; D.C. Federal Race and Ethnicity Report, supra
note 108; Michigan Gender Report, supra note 105; Michigan Racial Report, supra note 108.
1
2 See supra text accompanying note 98.
"3 For an interesting discussion of social construction of meaning and social reality,
see Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943 (1995); see
also Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterence, 83 Va. L. Rev. 349
(1997).
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influence perceptions in society and society's concepts of justice." 4 These
actors must endeavor to undermine stereotypes that victimize individuals
instead of exploiting them. This responsibility must include the newest actor
in our system of justice, the media.
In theory, the community has always been an intended participant in
our system of justice;" 5 as technology has advanced, the media has
increasingly been the avenue for that participation. With the advent of
cameras in the courtroom, the community has the ability to participate in the
justice system as never before. Court TV and CNN have made court
proceedings accessible to most Americans in their living rooms. Lawyers and
judges have become commentators and "sound-bite" educators. Some of these
legal commentators participate with the explicit intention of influencing
outcomes. 16 There is no doubt that the media's interaction affects our
perceptions of justice. A good example of this is the criminal trial of O.J.
Simpson. One of the reasons the O.J. criminal trial has been referred to as the
"trial of the century" is because of the breadth of media coverage.17
D. The Persistence of Stereotype-Perspective, Juries, and Justice (or
"Just Us")
Within the setting of the O.J. trials and the surrounding issues of
domestic violence, these stereotypes were played out in a modem context.
Nicole Simpson was charged with carrying the banner for "real battered
women." "The name Nicole Brown Simpson has now become synonymous
with the image of the battered wife-a young, beautiful woman, unable to
114 In addition to providing counter-stereotypic information, leaders in society have
a tremendous impact on our perceptions of others. See generally, Y. Bar-Tal, supra note 47.
Given society's general obsession with the courtroom, lawyers as a group are considered leaders
in society and have the ability to change perceptions both inside and outside of the courtroom.
115 See generally, Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as Constitution, 100 Yale L.J.
1131 (1991) (discussing the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments, Madison's proposed
Fourteenth Amendment, an early version of Article III, and all state constitutions penned
between 1776 and 1787).
136 For example, in representing his client, Dr. Jack Kevorkian, in matters concerning
physician-assisted suicide, attorney Geoffrey Fieger has mastered "sound-bite oration" in
presenting his case through the media. See George Cantor, Assisted Suicide: Geoffrey Fieger's
political quest, Detroit News, Jul. 12, 1997, at C6.
"' See Erwin Chemerinsky & Laurie Levenson, The Ethics of Being A Commentator
69 S.Cal. L.Rev. 1303, 1303-1307 (1996).
1998]
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law
escape her abuser, and unable to get the criminal justice system to respond to
her pleas.""'  With this portrayal, she became the image of the quintessential
victim, deserving the protection of, or at least retribution by, the justice
system.
This is not to suggest that Nicole's image only benefitted from the use
of stereotypes associated with "white womanhood." Consistent with a
psychological understanding of stereotype dichotomies (e.g., white/black;
good/bad), Nicole being married to, and having the children of (i.e., having
sex with), a black man meant she had broken social taboos and could not be
considered the "good chaste white girl."" 9 In addition, Nicole was portrayed
by O.J., by O.J.'s defense team,2 ° and by the media as deviating from the
"good girl" stereotype and therefore not deserving of protection from violence.
"Attempts by the Simpson defense team to paint Nicole as a partying drug user
are part of a time-wom tradition of depicting victims of male violence as bad
girls who deserved it."'' She was portrayed as a "promiscuous goldigger who
provoked her own abuse," '22 a provocateur who led a fast lifestyle that would
bring violence on herself through enumerable possibilities. 2 3 Though the use
"8 See Laurie L. Levenson, Stereotypes of Women in the O.J. Simpson Case, 1994
WL 681370 (O.J. Comm.); see also, Ammons, supra note 108, at 1006-7 ("Nicole Simpson was
white, beautiful, rich, portrayed as a good mother, and brutalized."). This characterization just
begs for comparison to women who do not fit the same profile, regardless of the reality of their
abuse. See id. (discussing a Cleveland prosecution of a black woman for killing her boyfriend
where the prosecutor, in closing arguments, compared the woman to Nicole Simpson, as if to
suggest the woman in this case was not a "real battered woman," like Nicole).
9 See Cheryl 1. Harris, Myths of Race and Gender in the Trials of O.J. Simpson and
Susan Smith-Spectacles of Our Time, 35 Washburn L.J. 225, 224-43 (1996).
120 See Larry Rubenstein and Donna Foote, Playing the Victim Card: the O.J. Defense
Outs Nicole's Reputation on Trial, Newsweek, Nov. 4, 1996, at 64. The defense team even
went so far as to hire Lenore Walker as an expert on battered women's syndrome, purportedly
to show that Nicole probably did not suffer from the syndrome and that O.J. did not fit the
"profile" of a batterer. See Sheryl McCarthy, O.J. on Trial: One More Sellout in the O.J. Case?,
Newsday, Fri., Jan. 27, 1995, at A4.
121 Ehrenreich, supra note 4, at 933.
122 Deborah L. Rhode, Simpson Sound Bites: What Is and Isn't News About
Domestic Violence, in Postmortem: The O.J. Simpson Case 83, 89 (Jeffrey Abramson ed.,
1996).
13 See Levenson, supra note 118; Rubenstein & Foote, supra note 120.
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of the "race card" in the criminal trial was both denounced and defended, use
of the "gender card" (in its racialized state) was silently accepted.'24
Criticisms of the (black women on the) O.J. criminal trial jury
included that they could not understand the issues of domestic abuse
adequately and that "their verdict" was not "just." Given the stereotypes
infused within the coverage of this trial, this perception of this jury is no
surprise.
To reemphasize the historical impetus for the stereotypes of black
women, lynch mob ideology was not intended for the protection of black
women, but to facilitate their physical and sexual exploitation.'25 Through
many years of activism, extrajudicial lynchings diminished considerably, I2 6
but judicial proceedings continued to allow for "legal lynchings," and
stereotypes continued to be reinforced. 27 The patent unfairness of such
proceedings led to the inclusion of black men, 2 along with the gradual121 ,,
inclusion of women, on juries, diminishing the number of "legal lynchings."
What has not diminished is the pervasive belief in stereotypes.
Now, even though we allow all citizens to physically participate in the
jury system, we accept their verdict as "just" only if it ideologically comports
24 "Gender card" refers to the use of stereotype to disempower and discredit women.
Specifically, "bad girl" stereotypes were infused within the trial to suggest that Nicole was less
than deserving of protection or sympathy. See supra text accompanying notes 77-80 and 102-
106. Stereotypes of black women (lack of intelligence and ability to sustain great physical
punishment making them less likely to understand domestic violence), were used to suggest that
the jury was incompetent and biased. See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
125 See supra text accompanying note 84.
126 Prior to World War I, the number of lynchings in this country diminished due
primarily to the efforts of Ida B. Wells-Barnett. See generally, Ida B. Wells-Barnett, On
Lynchings (1969).
'27 See supra note 76.
128 See Kennedy, Race Crime and the Law 172-180 (1997) (discussing the history of
the inclusion of blacks on juries, including Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)
(establishing the Constitutional right to be free of racial exclusion injury selection) and Norris
v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (celebrated for repudiating the fraud used to cover up racial
discrimination injury selections); see also, Abramson, supra note 6, at 105-112.
29 See Brownmiller, supra note 27, at 232, 245-48 (noting that women did not win
the right to sit on Alabama juries until 1966 or Mississippi juries until 1968). 1898 is
conventionally considered to be the date women were allowed to participate on any modern jury
in the United States when Utah authorized their participation; see also, Abramson, supra note
6, at 112-15. See generally, Carol Weisbrod, Images of the Woman Juror, 9 Harv. Women's
L. J. 59 (1986).
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with the perspectives of "mainstream" America. Understanding this, the
perception of "justice" is governed purely by one perspective, 130 belying any
notion of justice formed in a democracy. In this way, stereotype continues to
operate as a method of control, replicating the old system of "just us."
One of the broad intentions of the use of juries within our democracy
is that it be a "body truly representative of the community."' 3' Even prior to
the inclusion of minorities, including women, on juries, the jury was intended
to reflect the morals, values, and common sense of the people through their
various perspectives and as a component of democratic justice.' 32 Certainly
with the 1975 case of Taylor v. Louisiana 33 and the cases leading up to it,,
3 4
the requirement that a jury be drawn from a representative sample of the
community has come to mean full representation 35 of groups and the various
130 See Albert W. Alschuler, Our Faltering Jury, in Postmortem: The O.J. Simpson
Case (Jeffrey Abramson ed., 1996) ("Whites have begun to experience a glimmer of the fear of
our justice system that blacks and other minorities have experienced throughout our history.").
131 Abramson, supra note 6, at 115 (citing Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940),
extending the right of representation to all groups in the community). Akhil Reed Amar
discusses de Tocqueville's envisionment of thejury as populist and majoritarian where "the real
direction of society [is] in the hands of the governed,... and not in that of the government...."
Amar, supra note 114, at 1185 (1991) (citing, IA. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 293-
94).
132 See Abramson, supra note 6, at 22-33. In discussing the evolution of the jury,
Abramson also notes the common law tradition of the mixed jury, which was composed of half
the peers of one party and half the peers of the other. Id. at 106. Clearly, this was to ensure
fairness by including both perspectives. See also, Amar, supra note 115, at 1187 (discussing
the jury as a means of democratic participation for ordinary citizens).
133419 U.S. 522 (1975) (holding that the requirement that a petit jury be selected from
a representative cross-section of the community is fundamental to the Sixth Amendment).
131 See e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100
U.S. 315 (1880); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 197
(1943). See also, Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
Yale L.J. 1193, 1280-81 (1992) ("If women and blacks were central speakers in the
Reconstruction paradigm, would a jury of twelve white men be in every sense a jury of their
"peers"?).
135 I take no position on whether justice is satisfied when the selection procedures
ensure all persons are equally eligible for jury duty or only when there is proportional
representation on a jury or when there is some combination of the foregoing using legal
preemptory challenges. See Abramson, supra note 6, at 102; see also, Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986).
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perspectives within them, whether political, social, or ethnic. 36 Even in
efforts to seat an "impartial" jury, it is understood that perspective is
unavoidable. Jurors are expected to bring their own experiences and
perspectives into the deliberation process.'37 If we accept this premise, we
must accept each jury's interpretation of the facts in reaching their verdicts.
This does not necessarily implicate jury nullification, where jurors resist the
apparent application of law to fact. 3 I am merely suggesting that jurors stick
to their convictions and perspectives in ascertaining what is "apparent" in
applying the law to the facts. There are times when jury nullification is not
necessary: when, based on the honest evaluation of jurors from their own
experiences and perspectives, the jury interprets the facts such that they are
insufficient to justify application of the law in that case. After all, the case
where the facts are not absolutely clear is precisely the situation for which
juries were created. Of course, where the result is not consonant with the
majority perspective, there is the danger that verdict will be labeled
nullification. Unless we have full information, the operation of nullification
should not be presumed and the pronouncement of the jury should be
accepted.
Thus, we have a dilemma both for black women on juries and for
those perceiving their verdicts. Justice and the smooth continuation of our
system of justice depends on both the community's perception of it as just,"'
and the ability of all members of this community to meaningfully participate.
Therefore, we need to fashion a new understanding of "justice" through
136 See Abramson, supra note 6, at 102, 118; see also, Amar, supra note 115, at 1188
(pointing out that the jury was intended to be a political, not merely judicial, institution).
'1 Ilam not suggesting that jurors should be permitted to deliberate on the basis of any
bias, whether gender, race, or any other factor that would reduce the likelihood of a fair trial.
See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Ham v.
South Carolina, 409 U.S. 534 (1973).
"8 See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal
Justice System, 105 Yale L.J. 677 (1995) (advocating the moral responsibility of black jurors
to emancipate non-violent black defendants in response to pervasive racism within the justice
system).
"3 During the reign of the lynch mob, there were instances when lynch mobs would
kill a victim despite, or perhaps because, he was acquitted by a jury (even one which was all
white). Wells, A Red Record, supra note 71, at 36 (describing such an occurrence). Even
though the violence is no longer literal, the conceptual continues to have an affect on the
defendants, their juries, and our overall perception of justice.
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greater inclusion of the perceptions developed in a multicultural community, 4°
rather than relying on stereotype as a method of controlling the "consistent"
outcomes of jury deliberations.
With the interaction of the media, we have the opportunity to move
these very important issues of domestic violence into greater public concern.
Despite this opportunity, the issues of domestic violence will remain removed
from mainstream society if the stereotypes associated with violence are not
erased, or at least minimized. Unfortunately, media representations have
significantly contributed to the perpetuation of stereotypes associated with
race, gender, and domestic violence. 4' The jury used to be one of the primary
means of educating the populace for their civic roles. 4 2 Now the media has
overtaken that role and serves as the primary means of educating the populace,
before during, and after trials, informing perceptions of justice.
Juries, and representations of them and to them, are fundamental to
our perceptions of justice, enabling our system of justice to function; now, so
is the media. Lawyers, as advocates and media commentators, contribute to
the exploitation of the stereotypes that harm individuals and perpetuate
violence by leaving the conceptualizations of domestic abuse in place.
Lawyers, whether in the court room or through the media, need to be
responsible for educating the public about legal issues, like domestic violence,
and for eradicating stereotypes that impede the realization of real justice.'43
'40 See Abramson, supra note 6, at 241-50 (discussing the trials of Coontz, et al (for
the beating of Rodney King), Bernhard Goetz, the Menendez brothers, Lorena Bobbit,
Lemmerick Nelson, and a 1992 Massachusetts trial of a Catholic priest for blocking access to
abortion clinics, to name a few, where different perspectives have had a role in our perceptions
of justice).
" Documentation by FAIR (Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting), a national media
watch group, provides strong evidence that the use and manipulation of stereotypes in news
reporting is wide-spread. FAIR, Focus on Racism in the Media, 5 EXTRA!, Jul./Aug. 1992;
see also Kirk A. Johnson, Obiective News and Other Myths: The Poisoning of Young Black
Minds, 60 J. Negro Educ. 328 (1991).
142 See Amar, supra note 115, at 1187.
'43 See Johnson, supra note 76 at 1794 (advocating "race-shield" laws to remedy the
prejudicial effect of racial imagery on jury deliberations).
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III. PITTING RACE AGAINST GENDER-THE CHOICE...
A. The Dynamics of Power
Because dichotomous thinking is one-dimensional, 144 it does not fully
explain how stereotypes operate within dynamic, multi-dimensional,
competing hierarchies. Power is the defining essence of the dualisms. The
dualisms are also placed in hierarchy dependent upon the context. Within a
given hierarchy, the dualism with the most power relative to the situation
determines which stereotype is dominant. Reality circumscribed by normative
expectations directs "choice" in a particular situation towards the foundation
of power. 145 So, for example, Nicole could be negatively characterized in that
she was challenging male power; simultaneously, O.J. could be negatively
characterized to the extent he challenged white social order and class
structures; the predominantly black female jury could be denounced for the
perception that they were acting counter to the interests of white women or for
announcing a verdict contrary to "mainstream" expectations.
One consequence of one-dimensional, dichotomous, oppositional
thinking is that feminist and anti-racist efforts are systematically portrayed as
competing interests. 4 6 As already demonstrated, race and gender stereotypes
are interdependent. Therefore, it is counterproductive to work singly towards
the eradication of sexism without also eradicating racism.'47 The construction
'" The attraction of either/or thinking is its simplicity. See Minow, supra note 56, at
16. Unfortunately, this simplicityforces a fit into the resulting, limited concepts, perpetuating
the conceptual violence. See supra note 35.
'" Frances Olsen describes available choices as being limited to the ways in which
women's relationship to a dualism is perceived. See Olsen, supra note 20 at 1576; see also,
Minow, supra note 56, at 16 ("[Jlustice is the quality of human engagement with multiple
perspectives framed by, but not limited to, the relationships of power in which they are
formed.")
" Competition between the oppressed is an age old impediment to the efforts of anti-
oppression movements. Brownmiller, supra note 27, at 254; Harris, supra note 12, at 606. See
also Devon W. Carbado, The Construction of O.J. as a Racial Victim, 32 Hare. C.R.-C.L.
L.Rev. 49, 79 (1997) (pointing out that maleness is normalized in antiracist discourse just as
whiteness is normalized in feminist discourse). What is most interesting here is that this
framework forces competition within a single individual (or individuated category- i.e., black
women). See Crenshaw, supra note 12, at 1242.
" See bell hooks, supra note 12, at 13 ("[T]he struggle to end racism and the struggle
to end sexism were naturally intertwined, that to make them separate was to deny a basic truth
of our existence, that race and sex are both immutable facets of human identity."); Dorothy
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that characterizes racism and sexism as mutually exclusive phenomena,
misperceives the power impetus from which both arise. If competition
between the two efforts is engaged, the most privileged relative to the situation
may win the battle, but the competition itself perpetuates the existence of both
mutually reinforcing systems and stereotypes.
I am aware that this discussion itself has the potential to perpetuate
stereotypes, merely by pointing them out.'48 Nonetheless, recognizing the
function of stereotype and the reality it imposes is also a means of
demonstrating how the power structure simultaneously operates to privilege
some and disprivilege others.'49 All identity and its relative position in the
social power hierarchies are socially constructed. That is, gender, race, class,
religious affiliation, sexual preference, etc. only have meaning through what
we in society assign.50 Thus, the power dynamic creating privilege is
potentially shared by all who are oppressed.' 5'
Though my intention is to be inclusive, I do not mean to suggest that
all oppressions are equal, either in degree or kind. I only mean to suggest that
contextually, the privilege/disprivilege paradox may function substantially the
same in any given mode of oppression. What differentiates oppressions is the
relationship of the social constructs and the manner in which the power
balance is imposed. The specifics of the oppression are individualized by
external characteristics and context.
Just as stereotype is a form of conceptual violence,'5 2 a dynamic that
"normalizes" or "essentializes" one perspective is the dynamic that forces
competition among the disprivileged for the position of privilege and actually
operates to perpetuate the oppression inherent in the dynamic itself.5 3 Thus,
Roberts, supra note 21, at 3; Matsuda, supra note 21, at 1189 ("As we look at these patterns of
oppression, we may come to learn, finally and most importantly, that all forms of subordination
are interlocking and mutually reinforcing.").
'4 Minow, supra note 21, at 12.
'49 See id., at 56. ("[C]hallenging the hidden privileging of one perspective privileges
another in its place.").
'
5o See generally, Lakoff, supra note 46.
"' See Robin West, supra note 20, at 57 (suggesting that although men do not live
within the parameters of the oppressive conditions of patriarchy, they do live within those of
capitalism).
152 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
5 See Minow, supra note 21, at 38-45 (discussing the power of unstated norms).
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an extension of "dominance theory"'" would consider the dynamic of
dominance as a complex system that changes depending on the relevant
context and is able to deal with more than the male/female paradigm. 5
B. The Dynamic in Context
In the aftermath of the O.J. trials, the reactions and opinions of
African American women were framed in terms of a choice between racial
solidarity and gender activism. Specifically, the verdict of the predominantly
black female jury in the criminal trial was characterized as the consideration
of race winning out over considerations of gender.'56 Some commentators
suggested that black women have split loyalties to race issues and gender
issues and will generally choose the former. This presupposes that a "choice"
can be made and that the power exists to make it meaningful. Certainly, the
so-called "choice" between race and gender is much more complicated than
as represented by the media. In fact, the "choice" is often determined by the
way events are portrayed by the media and by which events are considered
news worthy.
Comparison of the O.J. trials to the Senate hearing of Anita Hill and
Clarence Thomas may demonstrate the power dynamics of stereotype more
clearly. The media portrayal of these occasions predictably played into
stereotypes directing them in favor of the dominant power structure.
The Hill/Thomas hearings were a high profile event 57 in our recent
history dealing with both race and gender issues.
All of us knew that white America would hear this story not just as
a lesson about the ubiquity of sexual harassment in the workplace
but as a story about oversexed black men... There was another part
of the story of black sexuality that all of us heard but few of us
See generally, MacKinnon, supra note 20.
'"See Harris, supra note 12, at 592-601 (suggesting that a complete theory is one
which "can shift focus from gender to race and other facets of identity and back again...").
56See Mike Littwin, Found Guilty of Ignoring Battered Women, Baltimore Sun, Oct.
9, 1995 ("It has been said enough times, and by more than enough pop psychologists, that black
women feel protective of the embattled black male.").
15' As in the O.J. trials, the national media played a significant role in the
administration and perception of justice. See Anna Deveare Smith, The Most Riveting
Television: The Hill-Thomas Hearings and Popular Culture, in Race, Gender, and Power in
America 248 (Anita Faye Hill and Emma Coleman Jordan eds., 1995).
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acknowledged: the story of the "unchaste" black woman who has
no right to refuse the sexual advances of any man. 5
Understanding that violence against women is a unified concept that manifests
itself in several ways,'59 it is no surprise that the stereotypes associated with
sexual harassment resemble those of domestic violence. A "victim" of sexual
harassment also has to be a "good girl." This means she cannot be single, she
cannot dress attractively, and she cannot be engaged in a typically "male"
job.'60 Even if she is "objectively" a "good girl," it is represented that she
likely misinterpreted the comment or occurrence, can't take a joke, or is lying
about the whole thing.1
6'
Professor Hill was subjected to an amalgam of stereotypic images.
"Many senators dismissed her testimony of having been sexually harassed by
Clarence Thomas with outright accusations that she was lying, and with sly
innuendos that she was a scorned, vengeful, and psychotic woman."1 62
Invoking further stereotypes, the "question"' 163 asked of Anita Hill was "why
had she remained silent for ten years.' 64 Thus, throughout the hearings,
Professor Hill was forced to prove her status as "victim," constantly being
compared to the virtuous "good girl" image, and simultaneously viewed and
depicted through the stereotypes which provide that black women can neither
be "good girls" nor "victims."
... Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Message of the Verdict: A Three-Act Morality Play
Starring Clarence Thomas, Willie Smith, and Mike Tyson, in Race, Gender, and Power in
America 107 (Anita Faye Hill and Emma Coleman Jordan eds., 1995).
'5 See supra, note 34 and text accompanying notes 51-53.
'6 Cf note 88 and accompanying text.
161 Once again, the effect is to place the blame with the victim of the harassment. Cf
note 34. And, once again, stereotype operates as a powerful tool of control, practicably limiting
the number of women who report harassment.
162 See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Hill-Thomas Hearings-What Took Place and
What Happened: White Male Domination, Black Male Domination, and the Denigration of
Black Women, in Race, Gender and Power in America 32 (Anita Faye Hill and Emma Coleman
Jordan, eds., 1995).
'63 This question parallels that most often asked of victims of domestic abuse, "why
didn't she leave?". See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
16 "Why didn't she display the emotions of outraged virtue? Her critics failed to
remember that such protestations by black women have rarely been taken seriously." Alexander
supra note 64, at 17.
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The stereotypes of black women, as promiscuous liars, contrary to the
image of the "victim," were specifically invoked in the Hill/Thomas hearings
through the explicit use of lynch mob ideology by the Supreme Court
nominee: the racial imagery of the so-called "high tech lynching."'
165
Surely, the lynching metaphor worked on a number of levels
because it offered multiple and contradictory characterizations. On
the one hand, Thomas could evoke sympathy in the black
community and guilt among whites by recalling the horrors of
"lynch law." At the same time, he could remind the Senate
committee subliminally that Anita Hill was no white woman on
whose word a black man should be punished-
166
This defensive technique was effective, not because there was the remotest
possibility of a true lynching or because the situation was even close to a
metaphorical correlation, 167 but because racialized gender stereotypes are so
embedded in our culture and accepted as truth without regard to reality. This
demonstrates the complex way in which the power structure of stereotype
operates. Since both Anita Hill and Clarence Thomas are African American,
the position of relative power in the situation was male. Thus, Clarence
Thomas benefitted from the imagery in that he became the "victim" of a
wrongful stereotype. 168 Once this position was established in the dichotomy,
Anita Hill had to be molded to the oppositional structure: the "bad girl" who
165 In addition, once race became a primary issue, gender issues were obscured. See
Emma Coleman Jordan, The Power of False Racial Memory and the Metaphor of Lynching in
Race Gender and Power in America: The Legacy of the Hill-Thomas Hearings 37, 38 (Anita
Faye Hill and Emma Coleman Jordan, eds., 1995) ("When Clarence Thomas asserted that he
was the victim of a high-tech lynching at the hands of the all-white male Senate Judiciary
Committee, he not only played the race card against whites, he trumped the gender card of a
black woman's claim of intraracial sexual harassment.").
'66 See id.
167 See generally, Kendall Thomas, Strange Fruit in Race-ing Justice, Engendering
Power 364 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992); see also, Higginbotham, supra note 162, at 32 (noting
that there is no recorded instance of a black man being lynched for abusing a black woman).
,r As Martha Minow points out, claims of victim status often invite the rejoinder,
"I'm a victim too," and invoke competition for the status entitled to sympathy and redress. See
Minow, supra note 92, at 1431.
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was trying to subvert male power. In this way, Clarence Thomas acquired the
coveted role of the victim.'69
In comparison, in the O.J. criminal trial, the defensive technique was
the racial imagery invoked by the use of the epithet, "nigger" by police
detective, Mark Fuhrman. This in turn also invoked the framework of lynch
mob ideology. The intention of emphasizing this information was to invoke
images of the history of police brutality and injustice in the legal system to the
jury. The defense accomplished this end and successfully portrayed O.J. as
the victim. 70 However, within the dynamic of our stereotype framework, this
"race card" also reminded the rest of society that O.J. was a black man, not
just a white man in black face, 17 1 who had wealth and power, and relations
with white women. This situation superficially correlates with the core
essence of lynch mob ideology, invoking all of the stereotypes there
associated. With the visceral reactions elicited from both the use of the "race
card" and the verdict, there is no doubt that these stereotypes affected our
collective psyches.
In both the Hill/Thomas hearings and the O.J. case, black women were
criticized for "choosing" counter to the relative power position. It was
perceived, at the time of the hearings, that Anita Hill had made a "choice" of
gender commitment over her racial identity.'72 That is, by publicly making
accusations of sexual harassment against a black man who had the potential
to be on the Supreme Court, she was forsaking racial solidarity. Since, in the
69 An unfortunate consequence of "either/or" thinking is that we often accept the
existence of only one "victim," necessitating a struggle over victim status and precipitating
blame-shifting. See id., at 1429-30; see also, Carbado, supra note 146, at 79. This mode of
conceptualization belies the more complex understanding that an individual may be
simultaneously privileged and disprivileged. Minow points out, "Paradoxically, this blurs the
distinctions between degrees of harm, leveling all suffering to the same undifferentiated plane
of equal seriousness and triviality." Minow, supra note 92, at 1430.
'70 See generally, Carbado, supra note 146 (discussing generally how men are
privileged in the construction of racial victim).
". A good example of how we were reminded of his identity is the subsequent cover
of Time magazine, serving as background for articles concerning the O.J. criminal trial where
they had darkened his face. Time Magazine, Cover, Jun. 27, 1994.
172 Paula Giddings, The Last Taboo, in Race-ing Justice, En-gendering Power 441,
442 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) ("For many, what was inappropriate was that a black woman's
commitment to a gender issue superseded what was largely perceived as racial solidarity.");
Crenshaw, supra note 34, at 1473; Alexander supra note 64, at 16 ("Many black people
condemned her because she failed to uphold the 'solidarity of the race'-a solidarity that has
been crucial in the face of this country's longstanding and pervasive racism.").
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Hill/Thomas hearings, both players in this media drama were African
American, popular support was given to the one who was gendered male.'73
This is the apparent opposite of the perception of the predominantly
black female jury of the O.J. criminal trial where the predominantly black,
female jury was castigated for "choosing" racial identity over gender issues.
It would seem, however, that after the attacks on Professor Hill, cost avoidant
black women would then "choose" race issues as primary. Nonetheless, prior
responses would be irrelevant since the focus of power in the particular
situation is determinant. Thus, as between the domestic violence issues,
portrayed as "white," and the predominantly black jury and black defendant,
the court of popular support was for the "white" issues.
The final comparison made here concerns the race and gender
composition of the relevantjuries. In the Hill/Thomas hearings the "jury" was
the almost exclusively white, male Senate (and a completely all white, male
confirmation committee). I suggest that the Senate was "choosing"'74 gender
identity, when they tendered their support to Clarence Thomas because they
could identify with his predicament. 175 Perhaps also because they had the
option of ignoring the race issues (i.e., both actors were African American),
the white men on the Senate "chose" to support their rights as men. That is,
since they could identify with Thomas in his situation, they were essentially
protecting themselves. 176 What's more, they could not even indirectly identify
with Anita Hill. "They could not see her as one of their own mothers, sisters,
wives, or daughters-honest, virtuous 'ladies' worthy of both protection and
respect-and they could not escape the weight of centuries of assumptions
173 See Cornell West, Black Leadership and the Pitfalls of Racial Reasoning, in Race-
ing Justice, En-gendering Power 390,392 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) ("The idea of black people
closing ranks against hostile white Americans reinforces black male power exercised over black
women (e.g., to protect, regulate, subordinate, and hence usually, though not always, use and
abuse women) in order to preserve black social order under circumstances of white-literal attack
and symbolic assault.").
174 This was not the popular characterization even though we all have both a gender
and a racial identity.
171 One often cited example, but not the only, is the reputation of Senator Edward M.
Kennedy, generally alluded to through reference to Chappaquidick. See e.g., Adam Clymer, The
Thomas Vote: Analysis, San Diego Union-Tribune, Oct. 16, 1991.
176 See Jordan, supra note 165, at 38 ("A somewhat less obvious message of the
lynching comparison casts Thomas as a white man seeking solidarity with other powerful white
men who might see themselves confronted with similar allegations of past sexual harassment
of women employees.").
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about and abuse of African American women."' 77 Thus, they were also
"choosing" to support racialized gender stereotypes by implication of their
decision.17
The answer (or lack thereof) to one additional question summarizes
this discussion better than any conclusion I could formulate: If we can
characterize the verdict of the O.J. trials solely in terms of race, or in terms
of only gender, how should we characterize the subsequent backlash and
attack "'79 on the predominantly black female jury?
IV. DISMANTLING THE STEREOTYPES
A. Acknowledging Perspectives
The presumption that the dominant perspective is the only valid
perspective is the basis for the criticism of black women on the O.J. criminal
trial jury. Those in positions of relative social power expect the world to
coincide with their own view and expect that their view is that of everyone
else. 8 ' Making this assumption validates one's own perspective over those
of others and establishes privilege.' 8 ' Necessarily, the perspectives of others
"' Alexander, supra note 64, at 18.
178 Senators on the Judiciary Committee explicitly supported and perpetuated
stereotypes. Senator Arlen Specter repeatedly accused Anita Hill of perjury. Clymer, supra
note 175; cf., supra text accompanying notes 77-80. Senator James Exon expressed that he
could not believe Anita Hill since she stayed in her employment for so long despite the vulgar
behavior. Clymer, supra note 174.
1' One Los Angeles Times columnist said "wouldn't know DNA from the PTA" of
the predominantly black female jury. See Wilkerson, supra note 11, at 4. "The same jurors who
were praised for their attentiveness and thoughtfulness during the trial have been maligned,
second guessed, grilled and disparaged since the verdict, simply for carrying out their
responsibilities as jurors...." To the Contrary, Herald (Rock Hill, S.C.) Oct. 21, 1995, at 7A.
"s Martha Minow, Different Beginnings: Making All the Difference in Making All
the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law 379 (1990).
181 See Stroeb and Insko, supra note 18, at 29 (self-categorization and positive
differentiation is dependent upon out-group derogation to establish positively valued
distinctiveness).
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must be discounted/devalued in this process and stereotype is an effective
means that allows detachment from the bases of those perspectives.'82
Context allows us to avoid the pure abstraction of stereotype that
privileges some and excludes others.'83 Context facilitates an understanding
of the perspectives of others. This section examines in context the particular
dilemma of black women jurors in trials concerning violence against women,
especially where the defendant is black. Specifically, this section explores the
multi-faceted reactions, as opposed to the one unitary voice, of African
American women to the issues of domestic violence'84 infused within the O.J.
Simpson trial. In the very least, the interaction of race, gender, and class
affecting the lives of African American women within mainstream culture
must be explored to understand differences in perspectives.'85 Exploring the
differing life situations affecting the members of society powerfully combats
widespread acceptance of stereotypes.
B. Applying Context
African American women are affected by mainstream culture and
popular media just like everybody else. Indeed, most Americans have little or
182 See Mar J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as
Jurisprudential Method, 14 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 297, 299 (1992) ("[a]bstraction and
detachment are ways out of the discomfort of direct confrontation with the ugliness of
oppression.").
283 For example, Man Matsuda challenges us to use a multiple consciousness to
deliberately see the world from the standpoint of the oppressed, to use the details of existence
in conjunction with the abstractions of standard jurisprudential discourse. Id., at 299. Martha
Minow suggests, "[a] useful strategy is to pay attention to competing perspectives on a given
problem, and to challenge unstated points of view that hide their assumptions from open
competition from others." Minow, supra note 21, at 56. Learning the perspective of another,
she adds, not only allows us to understand difference as a function of comparisons between
people, but also to "reject distinctions drawn between people which express or confirm the
distribution of power in ways that harm the less powerful." Id.
'" For an account of the real stories of battered black women, see Beth E. Richie,
Compelled to Crime (1996).
'85 See Lettie L. Lockhart, Spousal Violence: A Cross-Racial Perspective in Black
Family Violence: Current Research and Theory (1991) (explaining that in order to understand
differences in domestic violence occurrences by race, other variables, such as income,
education, employment status, and cultural expectations and values must be understood and
controlled); Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Panel Presentation on Cultural Battery in 25 U. Tol.
L. Rev. 891 (1995).
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no understanding of domestic violence issues."8 6 The most common reaction
to the plight of a women affected by battered women's syndrome' 7 is
disbelief and the question, "Why didn't she just leave?".' That African
'a6 As Elizabeth Schneider points out, "[e]mpirical studies ofjurors in cases involving
battered women who have killed their assailants suggest that jurors harbor widespread
misconceptions about domestic violence. Jurors tend to blame the woman for the abuse, and
for failing to leave the abuser, do not recognize the risks of escalated violence in leaving, and
trivialize the abuse." Schneider, supra note 24, at 178; see also LynNell Hancock, Why
Batterers So Often Go Free, Newsweek, Oct. 16, 1995, at 61("Jury Studies show that women
have a particularly hard time sympathizing with battered women who bring their attackers to
court. Female jurors are more likely than men to blame the accuser for her injuries.") Thus,
these views about domestic violence are not new, are not limited to the O.J. trials, are not
limited to one gender, and are not limited to one race, much less to only women of color.
' As described by Lenore Walker, the battered women's syndrome is a three phase
cycle of psychological and/or physical abuse: 1) the tension building phase during which time
minor battering incidents may occur and escalate and the woman tries to placate the abuser; 2)
the acute battering phase during which an acute battering incident will take place and the woman
experiences emotional collapse and feelings of helplessness; and 3) the conciliation phase where
the abuser is contrite and loving and obtains her forgiveness. Walker, supra note 33, at 55-70.
,88 The question assumes that controlling male violence or putting an end to it is the
woman victim's
responsibility, not the man's. If she falls to do so, she must leave, not he;
and if she stays, she deserves-or must want-whatever she gets. The
question assumes as well that the family home is not her home but his, and
he has the right to drive her out of it. She is the one who must abandon her
home, her treasured possessions, possibly her children, and often her
personal freedom to hide behind locked doors in some miserable,
overcrowded shelter. It is a measure of how far we have yet to go that 'why
didn't she leave?' is so seldom recognized as the outrageous question it is.
Gillespie, supra note 102, at 192.
In addition, a battered women is more likely to be killed when seeking help or leaving
the abusive relationship. See generally, Mahoney, supra note 27; Hart, supra note 27; see also,
Violence Against Women II, supra note 4, at 4 ("Among victims of violence committed by an
intimate, the victimization rate of women separated from their husbands was about 3 times
higher than that of divorced women and about 25 times higher than that of married women.").
Thus, many battered women are afraid to leave, or worse, stay or return to their abusers,
thinking they have a better chance of controlling the level of violence while they are with them.
Many victims of domestic abuse must also consider the care of their children, or they
lack the financial and emotional resources to be out on their own, or they succumb to the
psychological pressures to be the perfect family from their spouse, their families, and society.
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American women are a part of greater society and feed into its biases and
ignorances 189 is at least one partial explanation for some reactions. In fact, one
could easily suggest that the failure of the justice system is not so much in this
one, rather overly publicized case where the defendant was acquitted and the
issues of domestic violence obscured,' 90 but in the multitude of cases'91 year
Sex role socialization, economic dependency, and unsupportive institutions
combine to make the task of leaving an abusive relationship particularly
difficult. But despite mythology to the contrary, battered women are
actively engaged in changing their lives. Many leave their husbands,
hoping this will convince him that he must change. Some turn to family
networks that, through threats or physical retaliation, pressure him into
stopping his violence.... Women want their marriages to work, and
sometimes returning is an active attempt to put matters under their control.
Schecter, supra note 27, at 232.
"9 ' lhus, if O.J. Simpson did in fact kill his wife, there's nothing particularly unusual
about that. From the feminist vantage point, the thought of O.J. as a killer is not shocking, given
his history of spousal abuse. In fact, the thought of him killing his wife is rather mundane,
predictable-in short, nothing new. Men kill their partners (and ex-partners) every day."
Ehrenreich, supra note 4, at 933; see also, Violence Against Women I, supra note 4, at 1.
'90 Simpson was arrested in 1989 for beating and threatening to kill Nicole. She had
a black eye, swelling cheek, bruises, and scratches about her head. See Ellen Goodman, The
Boston Globe, Jun. 21, 1994. Ehrenreich points out that O.J.'s abusive behavior received little
attention while it was happening and the penalties were rather small for his plea of nolo
contendere: $700 fine and some community service and counseling. Ehrenreich, supra note 4.
None of Simpson's corporate benefactors thought the evidence of Simpson' abusive behavior
(before Nicole's death and the trial) or his plea of nolo contendere to charges of domestic abuse
was of concern for his image. "Hertz never considered the charge of wife-beating enough of a
character flaw to sully his image. Neither did NBC. And, this is the heart of it, neither did his
friends." Goodman, supra. This is indicative of the national complicity in domestic violence.
One student note points out the connection between domestic violence and
professional sports. It seems that these "incidents" receive fleeting attention while the accused
continue in their careers unaffected. Note, Out of Bounds: Professional Sports Leagues and
Domestic Violence, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1048 (1996) (arguing in favor of league-wide domestic
violence policies). In addition to the now infamous O.J. Simpson and the well publicized
actions of Minnesota Vikings quarterback Warren Moon, the list of prominent sports figures
accused of domestic violence includes "Chicago Bulls forward Scottie Pippen, San Francisco
Giants outfielder Barry Bonds, Colorado Rockies outfielder Dante Bichette, Atlanta Braves
manager Bobby Cox, Florida Panthers goalie Mark Fitzpatrick, Cincinnati Bengals defensive
lineman Dan Wilkinson, Denver Broncos receiver Vance Johnson, and former Kansas City
Chiefs receiver Tim Barnett." Id. 1, n. 14 (citations omitted).
'9' "On average each year, women experience 572,032 violent victimizations at the
hands of an intimate...." Violence Against Women I, supra note 4, at 6. "Over two-thirds of the
violent victimization against women were committed by someone known to them." Id. at 1.
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after year where violence in the domestic context is overlooked' 92 or under
penalized, 93 marginalizing the plight of victims of domestic abuse.
94
American society is in a collective state of denial concerning the issues of
domestic violence and has been for many years.
Consistent with the understanding that African American women are
part of a societal whole, many African American women have had exposure
to, or experience with, domestic violence. Thus, some reactions may be of
understanding, consistent with empathy based on a similar experience to
Nicole's. Despite the lack of media attention given to these women, I am sure
there were many African American women who were also watching the O.J.
trials for its potential impact on issues of domestic violence in this country as
they may have had to deal with its aftermath. 95 In fact, there is a lack of
media attention to domestic violence issues in general and to those specifically
in minority and poor communities. One black woman pointed out, "There has
been domestic violence going on in South-Central Los Angeles for years....
How come when it happens in Brentwood it's such a big issue?"'196 Why
aren't we interested in the violence that occurs among the poor of same race?
Are we only intrigued by the implication of power created stereotypes of
wealth and interracial relationships? 97
92 Police are more likely to make formal reports if the offender is a stranger rather
than someone known to the victim and are also more likely to search the scene for evidence in
this situation. See Violence Against Women I, supra note 4, at 10.
'93 Through her research, Barbara Hart has demonstrated that, "[miany battered
women who earnestly seek prosecution find substantial resistance to the appropriate charging
of defendants. National data reveal that law enforcement routinely classifies domestic assault
as misdemeanors even though the criminal conduct involved actually included bodily injury as
serious or more serious than 90% of all rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults." Hart, supra
note 27, at 627.
194 The rate of violence against women has remained constant for the last two decades.
See Violence Against Women I, supra note 4, at 1. This rate will continue to remain constant
if we do not find better ways for society to deal with the issues.
'9' See supra note 3.
19n Charrisse Jones, Nicole Simpson. In Death, Lifting Domestic Violence to the
Forefront as National Issue, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1995, at A28.
' See infra, text accompanying notes 220 and 221.
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Because of the interaction of gender, race, and class, creating a
personal dynamic quite different from that of Nicole,9 8 some African
American women may have been inclined to disbelief. In addition to the
classic victim's cycle of domestic abuse, which is almost a paralyzing force
preventing a woman from leaving her abuser,'99 many African American
women also stay in abusive relationships to "present a unified front." That is,
because the national media and politicians have historically assaulted the
black family as degenerating in a "tangle of pathology,"" ° many African
American women feel the need to stay in their relationships, keep their
families together, and be unified against outside oppressions and stereotypic
representations. 2°' They feel that to break up their families would just add to
the problems of both their own families and the problems of the black
community.
202
"'8 Women of color are subject to both ideological and literal violence of sexism and
racism in ways that do not appear from just one in isolation. Crenshaw, supra note 12;
Carraway, supra note 15, at 1306 ("Many of the types of violence that women of color
experience plague our society generally. The difference in the case of women of color is the
degree to which these types of violence combine us.").
199 See supra note 188.
0 See Office of Policy Planning and Research, U.S. Department of Labor, The Negro
Family: the Case for National Action 29 (1965) reprinted in The Moynihan Report and the
Politics of Controversy: A Transaction Social Science and Public Policy Report (Lee Rainwater
and W.L. Yancey eds., 1967); but see, Waheema Lubiano, Black Ladies, Welfare Queens, and
State Minstrels: Ideological War by Narrative Means in Race-ing Justice, En-gendering Power
337-338 (ed., Toni Morrison) (discussing how the Moynihan Report contributed to the
perpetuation of stereotypes like the "welfare queen" and the "culture of poverty"); Carl
Ginsburg, Race and Media: the Enduring Life of the Moynihan Report (1989) (discussing media
endorsement of the images created by the Moynihan Report); William Ryan, Mammy Observed:
Fixing the Negro Family in Blaming the Victim 63 (1976).
201 Since there is already so much negative information about black families, the task
of calling attention to violence in the African American community is a painful one. Richie,
supra note 27, at 41.
202 Id. Thus, the desire to fight the stereotype of the broken African American family
actually traps black women in abusive relationships. Conversely, perhaps because the
stereotypic image of the white family is one of stability and tranquility, white women who are
abused may have the problem of being taken seriously, also trapping them in the situation.
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African Americans are also disproportionately represented among the
poor.2"3 Breaking up the family means breaking up the potential resources.2°4
Because Nicole would not have had to deal with the same kinds of oppression
in her life (i.e., she experienced white privilege and an affluent lifestyle), 20 5 it
may have been just as difficult for an African American woman experiencing
domestic abuse to understand why Nicole didn't stay away from her abuser.20 6
Just as Nicole's personal dynamic was different from those of many
black women subjected to domestic abuse, O.J. also was not subject to the
same personal dynamic and oppressions to which most African American men
are subjected. O.J.'s affluence allowed him to escape much of the stress
associated with racism in society, eliminating one of the pressures that
contributes to the cycle of violence in communities of color.207 In fact,
because of his celebrity status, O.J. was not viewed as "black" by mainstream
Americans. 208 Taking this in tandem with the historic reverence for white
203 See Dynamics of Poverty, supra note 87, at 5 ("Blacks were almost three times as
likely to be poor in an average month.").
2 04 Lenore Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic
Consequences for Women and Children in America 54-61 (1985).
205 See Hancock, supra note 186. ("If gender biases were not enough to keep the jury
skeptical, Nicole was also rich. She owned a condo, a flashy car and sexy clothes. She wasn't
trapped by poverty ..... She could, less affluent women may think, have bought herself a
bodyguard.").
206 In fact, as bell hooks points out, "[tihe vast majority of poor black women in this
society find they are continually subjected to abuse in public agencies, stores, etc. These women
often feel that abuse will be an element in most of their personal interactions. They are more
inclined to accept abuse in situations where there are some rewards or benefits, where abuse is
not the sole characteristic of the interaction." bell hooks, supra note 12, at 125.
207 See infra note 214.
20 As Cheryl Harris points out, "as a racially androgynous (Black) man-one
accorded the status of honorary white because of his value as a commodity (not unlike the
Michaels-Jordan and Jackson)--he was granted a cloak of racial invisibility. For a time, he
was permitted to function as the special exemption and allowed to share that which patriarchy
has so often sought to protect-sexual access to white women." Harris, supra note 119, at 236.
In fact, "To the extent that Simpson had been given the status of honorary white, many whites
reject the possibility that he could be the target of racism." Id. at 239; But see, supra note 169.
O.J.'s "honorary white" status intensified the sense of betrayal by mainstream white
America. Harris, supra note 119, at 239; see also Susan Estrich, O.J. is Crying Wolf on Race//
He's No Victim of Racism; He's Profiting From it, USA Today, Jan. 26, 1995, at 13A ("Forget
about the fact that what made O.J. different was that nobody treated him like he was black.").
This sense of betrayal precipitated the subconscious default to the classic stereotype of the
"Black brute assaulting a virginal white female." Harris, supra note 119, at 244. Thus,
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womanhood (or, for the stereotypes there associated),20 9 many African
American women may understand that O.J.'s relationship with Nicole was part
of the indica of his success.210 So, even if African American women believed
that Nicole would not necessarily have stayed away from her abuser, she may
not have believed that O.J. would abuse his "prize. 211
Interaction of the justice system, especially the police, with
communities of color is a major factor contributing to a dynamic that cannot
be ignored in understanding the broad picture of domestic violence as it
pertains to women of color.2 '2 There is a general distrust of the justice system
by people of color that is well founded in history. This includes both legal and
extra-legal persecution of the hyper-sexualized black male for perceived
indiscretions with chaste white women, an ideology which permitted and
entire era ofextrajudicial lynching.213 Violence perpetrated on people of color
by the police or other persons of authority is not a new or waning
phenomenon. We have only scratched the surface when we consider the high
profile cases of police brutality against people of color.214 Thus, there is the
"domestic violence-was not constructed as harm done to an autonomous individual but as
harm done to a white woman's body-a body which has traditionally been considered the
exclusive property of white men." Id. at 243.
209 See supra text accompanying note 78.
210 In addition to the other stereotypes to which Nicole was subjected, see supra text
accompanying notes 118-123, she was also portrayed as a "trophy wife," an opportunist who
served best as a reward or an ornament for a successful man. Levenson, supra note 118, at 1.
211 See supra, note 72.
212 See Richie, supra note 27, at 43 ("How can blacks in the domestic violence
movement reconcile the reality of police brutality and blatant racism in the criminal justice
system with the need for police and court intervention on behalf of battered women?").
213 "As we have seen, in many instances mobs did away entirely with even the form
of due process by simply lynching Negroes accused of raping white women. In the event that
a suspect escaped a real lynching, he often faced the prospect of a "legal lynching": an execution
sanctioned by the forms ofjudicial process absent the substance ofjudicial fairness." Kennedy,
supra note 128, at 88-90 (citing two case examples of "legal lynchings").
214 See Gregory Howard Williams, The Rodney King Incident: Isolated Occurrence
or a Continuation of a Brutal Past?, 10 Harv. BlackLetter J. 79 (1993) (discussing the use of
non-deadly force in communities of color, citing several incidents); see also, Johnson, supra
note 76, at 1740 (noting the animal imagery used to describe the victim in the criminal trial
where the four white police officers were acquitted).
The beating of Rodney King has become an infamous reference for the treatment of
black men by the justice system. It is nonetheless not so unique or only a reference to past
practices. A recent example of police brutality against black men is in the torture case of a
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very real possibility of inviting violence against men accused,2'5 extending and
exacerbating the violence. There is also reticence in reinforcing gender
specific racial stereotypes of the inherently violent black male. 2 6 Inviting
Haitian man by Brooklyn Police, where the officers sodomized the man with the wooden handle
of a toilet plunger, puncturing his intestines and bladder from shoving it into his rectum and
then breaking his teeth from ramming it into his mouth. See David Kocieniewski, Injured Man
Says Brooklyn Officers Tortured Him in Custody, N.Y Times, Aug. 13, 1997, at B2; David
Kocieniewski, Relatives, Not Officers, Were First To Complain, N.Y Times, Aug. 14, 1997, at
B6; John Kifner, Thousands Call on City Hall to Confront Police Brutality, N.Y. Times, Aug.
30, 1997, at A3.
213 "Minority offenders are sentenced to prison more often and receive longer terms
than whites convicted of similar crimes and with similar records." Charles J. Ogletree, Does
Race Matter In Criminal Prosecutions, The Champion, Jul. 1991, at 14 (citations omitted). As
of February 9, 1997, "[o]nly four white defendants have been put to death for killing black
victims in the United States, while 91 black defendants have been put to death for killing
whites." Scott Richardson, Deadly Debate H Legal Experts Differ on Capital Punishment Ban,
Pantagraph (Bloomington, Ill.), Feb. 9, 1997; see also Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp:
Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388, 1391 (1988)
(noting that based on empirical research on race and capital sentencing, the state places a higher
value on the lives of whites than blacks.) This discussion of race and capital sentencing
becomes particularly poignant when you also consider that prior to the 1977 case of Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, capital punishment was permitted for rape and traditionally reserved for
black men who were convicted of raping white women. See Estrich, supra note 27, at 107 n.
2.
26 A common view that black battered women hold is that black men only batter
because they need a place to release the anger and frustration that comes with dealing with a
racist outside world. "[Domestic violence], like substance abuse, crime, and unwanted
adolescent pregnancy, are symptoms of living in a systematically deprived society that is
designed to dominate and control third world people." Richie supra note 27 at 41. As one
African American woman put it, "[t]he reason a black man may beat his wife is because he is
facing racism on his job and racism in America ..... What is the reason a white man beats his
wife? It's certainly not because of oppression in America." Wilkerson, supra note I1. From
this perspective, eliminating racism in society and the violence intendant would in turn eliminate
sexism and its intendant violence. Richie, supra note 27, at 42; Crenshaw, supra note 12, at
1258; see also, supra note 198 and accompanying text. This view of battery belies the concept
of sexual oppression and rests responsibility for violence in white society.
This view is not unlike (white) feminist views that women will not be able to
understand their true selves and differences, including any racial differences, until women are
free from male domination. In discussing Feminism Unmodified, Katharine Bartlett points out
that MacKinnon
speaks of "women's point of view," "woman's voice," "woman's
distinctive contribution," of standards that are "not ours," of empowering
women "on our own terms," and of what we "really want." These
references all suggest a reality beyond social construct that women will
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police involvement would provide one more reason for the perpetuation of
such stereotypes,1 7 and would in turn perpetuate racism and continue the
conceptual cycle of societal violence.
Second, women of color often have a lack of confidence in the
systems ability to serve their needs. There is both a real and perceived lack
of interest by the police in the complaints of black women. 21 8 Generally, there
discover once freed from the bonds of oppression.
Katharine T. Bartlett, MacKinnon's Feminism: Power on Whose Terms? (Book Review), 75
Calif. L. Rev. 1559, 1566 (1987) (citations omitted); Angela Harris, supra note 12, at 491-92,
n.47.
217 There was no widespread mainstream outrage from cases taking advantage of
perpetuated stereotypes and falsely accusing black men, like the Charles Stuart case where
Stuart, a white man, fabricated the story that a black man shot him and his pregnant wife when,
in fact, he himself was the murderer of his wife. In response, the police instigated a manhunt
directed at black males, while insufficiently investigating the inconsistencies in Stuart's story.
Stuart Dies in Jump off Tobin Bridge After Police Are Told He Killed His Wife; Image Proved
Unjust, Boston Globe, Jan. 5, 1990 at 1; See also Johnson, supra note 76, at 1744.
Nor was there outrage in the case of Susan Smith case, where Susan Smith created
a mythic black assailant who kidnaped her children at gun point in a carjacking. The national
media and the country believed her story. A sketch of the suspect was even publicized. The
police picked up and interrogated several black men before she confessed, nine days after she
made up the story. See Rick Bragg, An Agonizing Search for Two Boys, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28,
1994; Terry Don, A Woman's False Accusation Pains Many Blacks, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1994;
Jesse J. Holland, Nation Grapples With Racism Question Following Confession, L.A. Sentinel,
Nov. 16, 1994; Same Old Song: "A Black Man Did It", L.A. Sentinel, Nov. 16, 1994.
Lack of popular concern or meaningful responses for the injustices against people of
color give reason for communities of color to believe that the perpetuation of violence on
communities of color will not change any time soon. Incidents like these reinforce stereotype
in several ways: the black man as the perpetual perpetrator (see text accompanying notes 91-92;
note 93), and the propensity of whites (particularly women) to lie (see notes 81-82).
2 " Even though activism has begun to change the way the police are trained and the
protocols by which they are governed, the police are not exempt from the attitudes about race
and gender that pervade society. "Two of the most common beliefs and the ones most likely to
affect your interaction with the police as an abused black woman are 1) domestic violence is a
private 'family matter' in which the police shouldn't interfere and 2) violence is a 'natural' part
of black culture." Evelyn C. White, Chain Chain Change: For Black Women Dealing with
Physical and Emotional Abuse 36 (1985).
"After one acknowledges the limitations of statistical correlations, however, there
remains the patterns plus anecdotal evidence which adds plausibility, if not probability, to the
fear that legal systems continue to regard the victimization of black women with less concern
than the victimization of white women." Kennedy, supra note 128, at 73-74 (discussing the
1988 commissioned study, reported in, Race Tilts the Scales of Justice. Study: Dallas Punishes
Attacks on Whites More Harshly, Dallas Times Herald, Aug. 19, 1990 and the work of Gary D.
LaFree in Rape and Criminal Justice: The Social Construction of Sexual Assault (1989)).
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is a pattern of not treating very seriously the complaints of domestic related
violence by any women, as it is usually dismissed as a private affair.219 For
black women the problem is exacerbated by the racialized gender stereotypes
of them: the uncontrollable, promiscuous black woman who is capable of
sustaining greater physical abuse than her white counterpart, and who is
herself capable of violence.22 °
This is also compounded by a belief that shelters and institutions
established to help battered women are only for the needs of white women.22'
Understandings, real and perceived, that resources are primarily available for
white women and the necessity that they themselves take care of their
"Evidence concerning police behavior also documents the fact that the claims of
Black rape victims are taken less seriously than those of whites." Wriggins, supra note 27, at
122 (citing a study on the treatment of rape victims); see also Brownmiller supra note 27, at
212-214; hooks, supra note 12, at 51-86. "In sum, Black women who are raped are racially
discriminated against because their rapists, whether Black or white, are less likely to be charged
with rape, and when charged and convicted, are less likely to receive significant jail time than
the rapists of white women." Crenshaw, supra note 12, at 1277. In other words, just as society
values the lives of black men less than others (see Kennedy, supra note 215, at 1391), society
does not value black women victims very much. See Gary D. LaFree, The Effect of Sexual
Stratification by Race on Official Reactions to Rape 45 Am. Soc. Rev. 842, 847-48 (1980) (after
accounting for the effects of other variables, rapists (black or white) of black women were
penalized less harshly than rapists of white women).
2'9 Barbara Hart points out that "u]nlike other victims of violent crime, battered
women are often viewed by the police, the prosecutor, judges, jurors, and probation/parole staff
as responsible for the crimes against them--responsible either because battered women are
believed to 'provoke' the perpetrator into violence or because they are believed to have the
power to avoid the criminal assault through accommodating the perpetrator's demands." See
Hart, supra note 27, at 626-7; see also Rhode, supra note 122, at 88.
220 See supra notes 86-87.
221 See generally, Schecter, supra note 27, at 271-81. "Speaking of the racism within
the battered women's movement, one white woman says:
Our idea of including women of color was to send out notices. We never
came to the business table as equals. Women of color join us on our
terms....
Knowing that we grew up in a society permeated with the belief
that white values, culture, and lifestyle is superior, we can assume that
regardless of our rejection of the concept, we still act out of that
socialization. The same anger and frustrations that as women we have in
dealing with men whose sexism is subtle, not blatant, is the frustration an
anger women of color must feel toward us.
Id. at 271 (citation omitted).
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domestic problems without such resources, would make it difficult to believe
that Nicole could not have dealt with her own situation with greater ease.
In addition there is no confidence in a public outcry for wrongs
against women of color as there would be for wrongs against a white woman
by a black man. The visceral nature of mainstream white responses to the
acquittal of the O.J. criminal trial reaffirms this conceptualization. It is also
interesting to note that the same responses did not exist for the acquittals of
William Kennedy Smith for the rape of a white woman222 or of the affluent
Claus Von Bulow for the murder of his white wife.2 3 The juxtaposition of
these responses to cases should at least give us pause.
Even more disturbing are the media choices in which cases are
"news," formulating our collective perception of reality for us. In 1990,
during the same week as the Central Park rape of a white woman jogger, the
rape of a woman of color, who was also sodomized and thrown from the top
floor of a four story building, was relegated to the back pages.224
222 William Kennedy Smith's acquittal was facilitated by the media portrayal of his
rape victim as a "bad girl." See supra text accompanying notes 77-79. Specifically, Kennedy
Smith's attorney's claimed that she had "a troubled background and emotional problems that
may have spurred her to fabricate her charge..." William Kennedy Smith's Attorneys Ouestion
Alleged Rape Victim/fDefense Claims Woman has Troubled Past, and Fabricated the Charges,
Baltimore Evening Sun, Oct. 15, 1991, at A3. Charles Lawrence uses a very appropriate
metaphor: 'The noble's sexual access to the serf's daughter and the lord's dalliance with the
downstairs maid are also stories of the rape of powerless women by powerful men, justified by
the portrayal of the victim as wanton and unchaste, without any wish, much less any right to say
no." Lawrence, supra note 158, at 114. "By portraying her as sexually aggressive, the defense
transforms her from the white woman on the pedestal to the fallen white woman, no better than
the inherently unchaste black woman whose veracity is always questioned." Id. at 115.
223 Claus Von Bulow was accused of twice trying to murder his millionairess wife,
Martha "Sunny" Von Bulow, by injecting her with too much insulin in order to inherit her
millions. He was convicted in a first trial, which verdict was overturned. He was acquitted in
a second trial, due in great measure to the exclusion of evidence permitted in the first trial. See
Suit Seeks to Cut Von Bulow From Will, Record, N. N. J., Jul. 21, 1985, at A54. Von Bulow
could easily afford such a successful defense.
Perhaps the lack of outrage stems from the power structures inherent in the stereotypic
perceptions. White men are supposed to have wealth and power that enable them to succeed,
in the justice system or otherwise. Black men are not supposed to challenge white supremacy
by having wealth and power, and certainly not by having access to white women, and most
importantly, not by having the ability to successfully navigate the justice system.
224 See Crenshaw, supra note 12, at 1268 (discussing the selection of media coverage
of the 28 rapes which occurred in the same week as the white jogger by black and Latino males
as being premised on race). Sheri Lynn Johnson asks, "why is the Central Park jogger case so
much more compelling than the intra racial rape of a poor black woman (also fairly dramatic
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C. Creating New Norms
Stereotypes affects everyone in society: judges, lawyers, jurors, and
other citizens who participate in the direction of government and society.225
Many of the stereotypes that affect individuals have been socially ingrained
for generations. 226 This is in part due to the fact that stereotypes are part of
our cognitive processes that condition how we understand the normative.2 7
Thus, finding concrete ways to counteract the use of stereotype and affect
normative applications will be a broad and difficult problem to address. Since
providing disconfirming information228 and leadership 229 are two ways that
cognitive psychology literature identifies to combat stereotyping, the legal
system, in its capacity for education, 230 and lawyers, in their leadership roles
within this system, are the best means of addressing stereotypes as they affects
the attainment and perception of justice.
Since stereotype is a fairly broad concept, it is difficult to define and
therefore difficult to regulate. As a general matter, stereotype subject to
regulation should not be categorically limited, but evaluated according to
context. Because of the nature of stereotype, a bright-line approach would be
arbitrary. An appropriate gauge in evaluating whether a statement should
qualify as regulated stereotype would be the prejudicial nature of the
statement under the circumstances.23 ' To place limits on the regulated speech,
evidence supporting the assertion at issue would serve to refute its
identification as stereotype. This limitation might work in the same way that
"truth" serves as a defense to a defamatory statement and effectively limits the
causes of action brought.
because her attackers forced her to jump from a twenty-one story building and she survived only
because she caught a television cable) that occurred that same year?" supra note 76, at 1745,
n.16.
225 See Trope, supra note 39, at 133.
226 Stroeb and Insko, supra note 18, at 16.
227 Id. at 5.
228 See Hewstone, supra note 18; Stephan, supra note 31.
"9See Y. Bar-Tal, supra note 47, Hewstone, supra note 18.
21 See Amar, supra note 115, at 1186 -87 (discussing de Tocqueville's concept of the
role of the jury as a means of educating citizens on their role in governing).
23 Cf infra text accompanying note 239.
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I will use an example to demonstrate how stereotype should be
evaluated: unwed fathers are poor care-takers for young children.232 As a
general proposition, this stereotypic statement is over-broad. It might be
statistically accurate.33 that most unwed fathers are inferior care-takers in
comparison to unwed mothers or other parents, married or divorced, but would
not necessarily apply to an individual within a particular situation.23 It is
quite possible, and known to be true, that some unwed fathers are superior
care-takers of their children, raising them as well, if not better than other
parents do. Thus, evidence supporting a stereotype is generally not sufficient
to rebut the presumption that its use in reference to a particular individual or
situation is inappropriate.2 35 Thus, my earlier suggestion that evidence
supporting an alleged stereotypic statement might serve as a defense to its
assertion should only apply to a general statement, never one intended to
affect the assessment of an individual.236 That is not to say that a more
specific statement of a similar nature would not be accurate. For instance, that
father, who happens to be unwed, does not clothe or feed his children, allows
his home to remain filthy, and emotionally ignores his children is a poor care-
taker of children. In this description, evidence independent of the stereotype
or to prove the stereotype is used to demonstrate his unfitness, not his status
232See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that the State cannot merely
presume that unwed fathers in general, and petitioner in particular, are unsuitable and neglectful
parents).
233A high statistical correlation between the alleged characteristic and some conduct
might demonstrate a causal relationship and therefore would be probative evidence relevant to
an individual situation. If such a causal relationship could be demonstrated, the connection
would not be stereotypical. As a general matter, stereotypes, as this article contemplates them,
are widely held beliefs without a substantive or provable factual basis. Mere correlation
between the alleged characteristic and some conduct would be more speculative than probative
and therefore prejudicial.
2 34See supra note 232, at 654 (discussing the State's argument that putative fathers are
generally disinterested in their illegitimate children and that in most instances the natural father
is a stranger to his children).
235See supra note 232.
236 Not all general statements are stereotypes, see supra note 18. Thus, explanations
concerning battered woman syndrome, for example, are not "commonly held, well-learned and
established associations among groups that comprise a standardized conception or image
invested with special meaning." Id. In fact, battered women's syndrome serves to counter the
commonly held beliefs about self-defense that usually do not apply to the situation of a battered
woman. In addition, its use might be considered a "rationality-enhancing" reference and
therefore appropriately asserted. See infra text accompanying notes 243-48.
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as an unwed father. Only evidence specific to that individual or situation is
appropriately used to demonstrate the truth of a situation.
This section endeavors to develop methods within current procedural
norms to allow for the acceptance of new norms. Even though one purpose
of this article has been to criticize the limitation of normative and standardized
approaches, it has not been to advocate the abandonment of our legal culture,
but to reform it. Addressing the problems associated with stereotype within
current legal norms may be the best way to affect fundamental changes in the
most acceptable fashion. Thus, the following proposals are ones that comport
with, and explicitly borrow from, current legal procedural norms.
1. Rules of Ethics
Establishing rules of ethics is one way of affecting norms accepted in
society. Since the legal system is at the core of our democracy, lawyers
should have a high degree of responsibility in effectuating these norms and in
our collective perceptions of justice. Limitations on the public use of
stereotype by lawyers would have two potentially beneficial effects on the
harmful affects of stereotype, both generally in society and specifically within
the courtroom. First, the conduct of lawyers, as leaders in society, may
constructively affect the conduct and cognitive reception of stereotype by
others.237 Second, even though this may not be a means of actively providing
counter-stereotypic information,238 it would diminish the amount of
stereotype-confirming information available in society.
I propose a three tiered-approach to ethics rules concerning
stereotype: rules for lawyers actively engaged in litigation; rules for lawyers
not actively engaged in a controversy, but relying on their specialized
knowledge to comment publicly on the matter; and rules for non-lawyers
commenting on a matter in controversy. This tiered approach is intended to
address the First Amendment issues necessarily implicated by the restrictions
on speech.
Lawyers who are actively engaged in a matter of litigation should not
explicitly use stereotypes or stereotypic innuendo concerning the subject
matter of, or any of the participants in, that case. Since stereotype is a fairly
broad concept, it is difficult to define and therefore difficult to regulate. As
a general matter, stereotypes subject to regulation should not be categorically
237 See Hewstone, supra note 18; Stephan, supra note 31; Y. Bar-Tal, supra note 47.
238 Id.
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limited, but evaluated according to context. Because of the nature of
stereotypes, a bright-line approach would be arbitrary. An appropriate gauge
in evaluating whether a statement should qualify as a regulated stereotype
would be the prejudicial nature of the statement under the circumstances.239
To limits on regulated speech, evidence supporting the assertion at issue
would serve to refute its identification as a stereotype. This limitation might
work in the same way that "truth" serves as a defamatory statement and
effectively limits the causes of action brought.
Since stereotypes, by their function of avoiding the real situation and
obscuring the fact finding process, have a "substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding," such a rule could easily be included
within the ambit of Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6.2' The
Supreme Court, in Gentile v. State of Nevada, 24' specifically addressing Rule
3.6, held that this standard is a permissible regulation of attorney speech. To
the extent that stereotype is prejudicial, regulation of such speech should also
be permissible under Rule 3.6 to meet the objective of fair judicial
proceedings. Rule 3.6 should be amended to specifically include stereotype
as regulated speech.
The most difficult case for regulation is within the second tier, rules
for lawyers not actively engaged in the controversy, but relying on their
specialized knowledge to comment publicly on the matter. Rule 3.6, as
amended in the paragraph above, should apply in this case as well. Objections
to extending the rule in this manner will be that these lawyers are acting as
private citizens, and perhaps as members of the press, and therefore their
speech should be protected and not subject to any exceptions under Gentile.
Considering the history of protecting the speech of individuals and most
especially that of the press, this is a reasonable argument. Nevertheless, the
Court in Gentile determined that the state has an interest in protecting the
239 Cf infra text accompanying note 246.
24oRule 3.6 provides that lawyers who participate in the litigation of a matter "shall
not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated
by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will
have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding in the matter."
241 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
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"integrity and fairness '24 2 of the justice system and that trial verdicts are to be
decided by "impartial jurors. '24 3
Since the objective of preserving the justice system by affecting
societal perceptions is an important governmental concern, attorney
commentators not directly involved in any controversy should also be included
within the above rule. Indeed, the regulations proposed in this section may be
easier for lawyers not directly involved in a controversy to follow than those
who are. Attorneys who are not actively engaged in the matter of controversy
do not have the conflicting obligation of "zealous" representation of their
clients, 24 and could therefore focus exclusively on the ideals of justice
impartially.
We need to move beyond the exclusively adversarial paradigm for
legal interactions. Lawyers need to work toward the reduction of externalities
and maximization of social utility within the judicial process. Since lawyers
shape the formation and interpretation of the law, they must care about justice.
In other words, the law's relationship to justice must not be accidental.
The third tier for consideration is the possible regulation of non-
lawyers who engage in commentary concerning litigated matters. It would not
be permissible to regulate the speech of non-lawyers in this context.
Nonetheless, a voluntary code of ethics, 245 patterned after the above
suggestions for attorneys, could effectively meet the objectives of preserving
the justice system and perceptions of it. Certainly, if lawyers followed the
above rules of ethics, it would be much easier for lay-people to do so as well,
both through following example and through available stereotype-free legal
information.
2. Rules of Evidence
Since litigation is considered the core of the judicial process, rules of
evidence may be the most effective means of affecting the impact of
stereotype on the judicial process and on perceptions of justice. Rules of
242 Id. at 1075
243 Id. at 1070.
244 Both the Code of Professional Conduct and the Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility require zealous representation of a client's interests. See EC 7-1 and Comment,
Model Rule 3.1
245 See generally Chemerinsky and Levenson, supra note 117 (providing a more
detailed voluntary code of ethics for legal commentators in the media).
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evidence directly impact an individual's ability to obtain justice in a particular
case by determining both the quality and quantity of the avoiding prejudicial
effects on jurors. These rules also have the potential for determining the
perceptions of outside observers by curtailing the kinds of information widely
available to the public.
As described by Jody Armour, there are two potential uses for
stereotype within a judicial proceeding: "rationality-enhancing" and
"rationality-subverting" group references." 6 Rationality-subverting references
are "group references that exploit, exacerbate, or play on the prevailing
stereotypes that fact finders carry with them into the jury box. 247 Rationality-
enhancing references are "references that challenge the fact finders to
reexamine and resist their discriminatory responses., 248 The Court needs a
standard for distinguishing between the two. I suggest that statements,
allusions, or inferences that invoke stereotypic images and ideology should be
evaluated by the court using the same guidelines as for the admissibility of
evidence. The general rule would read:
Although relevant, stereotypic statements, innuendo and allusions
may be excluded if their probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury.249
This standard would allow evaluations of the prejudicial nature of the
stereotypic reference, allowing the admission of rationality-enhancing
references, while excluding rationality subverting references.
The rule concerning general admissibility might be supplemented with
rules modeled after evidence of character. Such a rule might read:
246 This terminology was originally coined byJody Armour to distinguish the potential
affects of stereotype on jury proceedings. See Armour, supra note 18, at 768.
247 Id. See also Johnson, supra note 76 (describing the affects of racial imagery and
stereotype in the justice system). This article has focussed almost exclusively on "rationality-
subverting" references.
248 Armour supra note 18. Armour uses examples, including a murder trial where
Clarence Darrow directly challenges jurors to examine their prejudices by first allowing them
to admit they have them, and the fictional trial in the movie Philadelphia where the attorney
used anti-gay epithets so that the fact finders were directly confronted with their habitual
stereotype congruent responses to gays. See id. at 762-3, 769-70.
249 Cf. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 403.
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Evidence tending to label an individual or influence others to treat
them categorically or prove traits that are stereotypic is not
admissible for the purpose of proving an action in conformity
therewith, except: Evidence or information intended to counteract
stereotypic effects for the purpose of evaluating the circumstances
of the case at hand within context... 2 °
Though an imprecise standard, it would operate with the same effectiveness
as the general rule for the admissibility of evidence. Other general rules and
protocol would then also apply, including corrective instructions, appeals, and
mistrials, where the weight of prejudicial effect would be determinative.
In addition to having the ability to distinguish between rationality-
subverting and -enhancing stereotypes, these rules also have the advantage of
equitable application. That is, all parties would be subject to the restrictions
and would benefit from the enhancement of the justice-seeking process. All
members of society, whether in the mainstream or on the margins, would have
better perceptions of the justice process. For example, some have suggested
that the use of the "race card, 251' by the O.J. defense team precipitated the
mainstream backlash against the verdict in the criminal trial and against the
efficacy of the jury system as a whole. One view of this might be that the
defense team successfully used stereotypes originally meant to oppress him
to his advantage.25 2
3. Jury Instructions
Another opportunity to minimize the harmful affects of stereotypes
occurs prior to jury deliberations in the instructions to the jury. As a routine
matter, judges should include a statement about stereotypes in their
preliminary instructions. A suggested instruction might be:
Ladies and gentlemen, your task is to evaluate this case based on the
facts presented, not on your beliefs, assumptions or stereotypes
concerning a particular group of people or a particular situation.
Only the facts and details, for which you have been presented
concrete information, should enter into your evaluations.
250 Cf Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 404.
' e characterization of the L.A.P.D. as racist and discriminatory is not necessarily
stereotype since there was evidence both of past practices and of practices in this case.
2"2 But cf supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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In addition, judges should give more specific instructions tailored to
the context of the particular case where obviously needed or as requested by
the litigants, keeping in mind the distinctions between rationality-enhancing
and rationality-subverting references. An example relevant to the content of
this article might include an instruction regarding the nature of abusive
relationships as distinguishable form other relationships:
Each of you are engaged in some form of relationship, whether it be
with a spouse, partner, sibling, or child. Certainly you should draw
upon your own experiences in your deliberations; however, you
should be aware that the (prosecution/plaintiff) is arguing that the
relationship here is different than other relationships in that it is
dependent upon the control of one individual over the actions of the
other. The question for you to resolve is not whether there are
arguments and disagreements, as there are in most relationships, but
whether the manner in which their problems were resolved was
appropriate.
Another instruction might address the operation of battered women's
syndrome:
Battered women's syndrome, as presented by the defendant in this
case, is intended to assist you in determining whether the defendant
acted in self-defense. Self defense requires that you find the
defendant reasonably believed her life was in imminent danger.
Your evaluation of the defendant's state of mind is critical to this
defense. Evidence of the battered women's syndrome was provided
to help you understand whether the defendant's belief was
reasonable given her specific circumstances.
The above suggested instructions should only serve as guides.
Advocates, in particular, must be vigilant about their use. These instructions,
or instructions intended to have a similar affect, are only useful where the jury
has already been educated about the relevant stereotypes in the preceding case.
In addition, the instructions given must be appropriate for the context of each
case and should be tailored specifically for it. For example, as demonstrated
in earlier sections of this article, the stereotypes for black women and white
women may be different. Also, the instructions should not be so rigid that its
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subject will only be addressed if there is a perfect fit.253 For example, it
should not be necessary for a victim of domestic abuse to be diagnosed with
battered women's syndrome in order to successfully assert self defense.
These instructions are the last opportunity to influence the perceptions
of stereotype by jurors in their deliberations. It is to be hoped that, in
combination with the other normative suggestions made above, the harmful
affects of stereotype will be minimized, favorably affecting the attainment of
justice and society's perceptions of it.
V. CONCLUSION
During and after the O.J. trials, many commentators discussed, with
apparent shock, how racially polarized this nation continues to be. These
discussions usually ended with the history of differential experiences in the
legal system or the disproportionality of minority representation among the
poor. And, in fact, these may be good reasons for such polarization.
However, the shock is rather misplaced when the media coverage of events
seeks the angle that demonstrates racial difference, using sound bites that
perpetuate stereotypic perceptions.254
Stereotypes trap their victims in a system of conceptual violence
compounding the physical. Every means of accepting or perpetuating a
stereotype, evading reality for the sake of convenience, is a form of violence.
The means for avoiding complicity in this system of violence, is to seek
context, not default understandings; to allow more than one's own perspective
to inform our perceptions. Making the effort to see situations as they really
are and truly hearing the stories of the individuals involved, instead of relying
on default assumptions and stereotypes is the first and hardest step in
achieving justice.255
Conceptualizations that reduce situations and individuals to an
abstraction is how we achieve the appearance of objectivity without
253 As with stereotype, I believe any rote categorizations should be guarded against.
25 See FAIR, supra note 141.
255 "Surely, some if not most of those viewers understood that O.J. Simpson was not
a typical defendant and that they needed a context within which to understand and to judge what
they were seeing. If and when television goes on to provide this context, by attracting similar-
sized audiences for the trials of ordinary, indigent defendants, then it will have turned the corner
from entertainment toward education." Jeffrey Abramson, The Pros and Cons of Televising
Trials, in Postmortem: The O.J. Simpson Case (Jeffrey Abramson ed., 1996).
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responsibility for the intendant violence.256 Dichotomous thinking is a form
of abstraction that creates stereotype. Reality is much more complex and
deserves a more dynamic approach. We need to approach our norms as being
dynamic and allowing context to be the guide. To achieve this objective,
education is the method. Lawyers must take a leadership role to educate the
citizenry, both in the traditional manner, to the jury, and through the now
prevalent means, through the media. This should include broader education
concerning the realities of domestic violence, as it exists everyday, not just as
a marginal issue in a highly publicized event. It needs to be accomplished
through community awareness that only the national media can effectuate.
Lawyers and the legal system must be active participants in this education.
With greater education, the stereotypes concerning domestic violence and its
victims will diminish, according real justice.
Education is also the means to provide for the acceptance of a broader
range of perspectives. The ability to accept various perspectives as informed
by their respective contexts is important to our system of justice, ensuring
sovereignty of the people.257 It informs the public's perception, and
acceptance, ofjustice, and allows for the meaningful participation of everyone
in society, which has always been an integral part of the legitimacy of our
justice system and government.
256 See supra note 35.
257 See Amar, supra note 115, at 1210 (suggesting that, to ensure the sovereignty of
the people, the idea of popular education continually resurfaces in the Bill of Rights).
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